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Someday, perhaps soon, diagnostics generated by machine learning (ML) will
have demonstrably better success rates than those generated by human doctors.
What will the dominance of ML diagnostics mean for medical malpractice law, for
the future of medical service provision, for the demand for certain kinds of
doctors, and in the long run for the quality of medical diagnostics itself?
This Article argues that once ML diagnosticians, such as those based on neural
networks, are shown to be superior, existing medical malpractice law will require
superior ML-generated medical diagnostics as the standard of care in clinical
settings. Further, unless implemented carefully, a physician's duty to use ML
systems in medical diagnostics could, paradoxically, undermine the very safety
standard that malpractice law set out to achieve. Although at first doctor +
machine may be more effective than either alone because humans and ML systems
might make very different kinds of mistakes, in time, as ML systems improve,
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effective ML could create overwhelming legal and ethical pressure to delegate the
diagnostic process to the machine. Ultimately, a similar dynamic might extend to
treatment also. If we reach the point where the bulk of clinical outcomes collected
in databases are ML-generated diagnoses, this may result in future decisions that
are not easily audited or understood by human doctors. Given the well-
documented fact that treatment strategies are often not as effective when deployed
in clinical practice compared to preliminary evaluation, the lack of transparency
introduced by the ML algorithms could lead to a decrease in quality of care. This
Article describes alient technical aspects of this scenario particularly as it relates
to diagnosis and canvasses various possible technical and legal solutions that
would allow us to avoid these unintended consequences of medical malpractice
law. Ultimately, we suggest here is a strong case for altering existing medical
liability rules to avoid a machine-only diagnostic regime. We argue that the
appropriate revision to the standard of care requires maintaining meaningful
participation in the loop by physicians the loop.
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INTRODUCTION
Someday, perhaps sooner,' perhaps later,2  machines will have
demonstrably better success rates at medical diagnosis than human physicians-at
least in particular medical specialties.3
We can reasonably expect that machine-learning-based diagnostic
competence, which we will sometimes call "A" for short, will only increase. It is
thus appropriate to consider what the dominance of machine-based diagnostics
might mean for medical malpractice law, the future of medical service provision,
the demand for certain kinds of physicians, and-in the long run-for the quality
of medical diagnostics itself.
In this Article, we interrogate the legal implications of superior machine-
generated diagnosticians, particularly those based on neural networks, currently a
leading type of machine learning used in prediction.4 We argue that existing
medical malpractice law will eventually require superior ML-generated medical
diagnosis as the standard of care in clinical settings. We further argue that-unless
implemented carefully-a physician's duty to use ML in medical diagnostics
could, paradoxically, undermine the very safety standard that malpractice law set
out to achieve. Once computerized diagnosticians demonstrate better success rates
than their human trainers, effective machine learning will create legal (and ethical)
pressure to delegate much, if not all, of the diagnostic process to the machine. If
we reach the point where the bulk of clinical outcomes collected in databases are
ML-generated diagnoses, this may result in future decision scenarios that are
1. See infra text accompanying notes 12-22.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 24-26.
4. Machine learning (ML) is the discipline of automated pattern recognition and
making predictions based on patterns that are detected. Neural networks are one of several
types of ML. "Deep Learning," another term of use, refers to neural networks with many
layers. "At" is a more general term applied to automated techniques that produce outputs
which appear to mimic human reason or behavior. Thus, deep-learning systems are a subset
of neural networks, which are a subset of ML, which is itself a subset of Al. IBM's Watson,
which we also discuss, is perhaps the best-known example of a neural-network-based
medical diagnostic system. See infra text accompanying notes 38-45.
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difficult to validate and verify. Many ML systems currently are not easily audited
or understood by human physicians, and if this remains true, it will be harder to
detect sub-par performance, jeopardizing the system's efficacy, accuracy, and
reliability. Once ML systems displace doctors in a specialty, the demand for such
doctors will shrink as will training opportunities for human experts. Because we
will continue to need humans to generate much of the training data for future ML
systems, this reduction in human competence may create roadblocks to the
continuing improvement of ML systems especially once new diagnostic sensors
are available. We maintain that such unintended consequences of medical
malpractice law must be avoided and canvass various possible technical and legal
solutions.
Our story has four acts.
1) We begin with the effect of existing law on the use of ML diagnostic
technology, be it neural networks or some other form of Al. We argue that once a
machine is demonstrably superior to human diagnosticians, malpractice law will
require the use of the superior technology in certain sectors of medical diagnostics.
Medical service providers who do not use ML systems will be said to fall below
the appropriate standard of care in cases where things go wrong, and hospitals that
use human physicians rather than ML systems will be subject to claims in
negligence-as will the treating physicians themselves.
2) Next, we consider the consequences that these novel legal
requirements might have on the overall demand for physicians of certain types and
the potentially diminished role that they might play in medical practice. We
suggest that he advent of superior ML diagnosticians will reduce the demand for
human physicians,5 much like the enhanced safety and efficacy of self-driving
trucks will increase the demand for robot drivers and decrease the demand for
human drivers.6 These consequences, flowing from the requirements imposed by
medical malpractice law, give rise to various narratives. To the extent that patient
outcomes are now better and perhaps even cheaper-depending on automated-
system service-provider pricing-these newly imposed legal requirements offer a
desirable neoliberal result: better living through technology. Of course, the
possible outcomes also comport just as well with the classic account of deskilling:
over-reliance on these machines could render obsolete the human cultivation of
medical skills and know-how developed over centuries.7 Indeed, robotic surgery-
5. It will likely increase demand for certain types of medical technicians. A
similar economic logic applies to robot surgeons and other medical specialties as they get
robotized.
6. Olivia Solon, Self-Driving Trucks: What's the Future for America's 3.5
Million Truckers?, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2016, 7:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/17/self-driving-trucks-impact-on-
drivers-jobs-us (Driverless trucks will be safer and cheaper than their human-controlled
counterparts . j..."); Scott Santens, Self-Driving Trucks Are Going to Hit Us Like a Human-
Driven Truck, MEDIUM (May 14, 2015), https://medium.com/basic-income/self-driving-
trucks-are-going-to-hit-us-like-a-human-driven-truck-b8507d9c5961.
7. See, e.g., HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE
DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 118-19 (Monthly Review Press 1998)
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which can perform some tasks more quickly and more accurately than humans'-
is already being accused of causing a loss of surgical skill among medical
trainees.9 That law has mandated the use of a new technology that produces
improved health outcomes might also make this tale a happy outlier to more
familiar stories of the law's interaction with technology-those in which law is
disrupted by the technical change and in which self-interested parties may seek to
hold off the change.'0
3) Regardless of which narrative best describes our second act, we believe
there is a third act that must also be considered: the development of a diagnostic
monoculture and other dangers associated with an over-reliance on ML. By
"diagnostic monoculture" we mean a scenario in which the medical and legal
systems standardize on a mechanized approach to diagnosis in a given sub-
specialty. Diagnostic monoculture exemplifies a more general problem that arises
when society comes to rely, to its detriment, on a dominant mode of thinking to the
exclusion of other possible solutions. In this case, a diagnostic monoculture that
leads to less input from human physicians could make quality control of diagnostic
databases much more difficult. The problem becomes far more serious once
reliance on ML goes beyond diagnosis to treatment. The reduction in new data
from physicians-that is to say the creation of a loop in which outcomes added to
the database are solely or overwhelmingly the result of ML-informed treatment
decisions-creates cenarios in which we cannot rule out the risk that sub-optimal
conclusions are reached. If a set of symptoms is consistently producing an
erroneous ML diagnostic, and physicians act on that erroneous diagnostic, where
will ML get the data to suggest a different diagnosis which leads to better
treatment? If the answer is "nowhere" then we have a problem. Worse, it is not
(1974); THE DEGRADATION OF WORK?: SKILL, DESKILLING, AND THE LABOUR PROCESS
11-12 (Stephen Wood ed., 1982); Stanley Aronowitz & William DiFazio, High Technology
and Work Tomorrow, 544 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 52 (1996), doi:
10.1177/0002716296544001005 (arguing that technology tends to destroy high-skill jobs
and replace them with low-skill jobs); but see Paul Attewell, The Deskilling Controversy, 14
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 323, 323 (1987), doi: 10.1177/0730888487014003001 (offering
theoretical and empirical critique of deskilling thesis).
8. See Hannah Devlin, The Robots Helping NHS Surgeons Perform Better,
Faster and For Longer, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2018, 6:00 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/j ul/04/robots-nhs-surgeons-keyhole-surgery-
versius.
9. See Matthew Beane, Shadow Learning: Building Robotic Surgical Skill
When Approved Means Fail, 64 ADMIN. SC. Q. 87, 87-88 (2018),
doi: 10.1177/0001839217751692.
10. For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is sometimes
accused of propping up outdated or anticompetitive business models in the face of easy
content-sharing. See, e.g., Ryan J. Shernaman, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The
Protector of Anti-Competitive Business Models, 80 UMKC L. REv. 545, 545-46 (2011).
Likewise, DMCA-type legislation has also been shown to undermine privacy. Ian Kerr, If
Left to Their Own Devices ... How DRM and Anti-Circumvention Laws Can be Used to
Hack Privacy, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW
(Michael Geist ed., 2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=902448.
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even clear that either the ML system or an outside observer necessarily would
know that the results were sub-optimal. From a human perspective, the challenges
associated with understanding and auditing an ML system's predictive diagnostic
process will become significant. Those challenges become greater if th  output of
the ML diagnostic system is then fed into a second ML treatment system. In that
case, absent personalized medicine, for any given set of symptoms one might get
consistent treatment decisions leading to less variegated treatment-to-outcome
data. The lack of variety in treatment could further mask any issues caused by sub-
optimal diagnoses and could lead to bad decision-making and, potentially, tragic
medical outcomes. To guard against this possibility, we will need a mechanism.
And until we know how to automate that too we may need a substantial corps of
medical researchers on tap to help audit and monitor the machines to spot
anomalies.
4) The approach taken in our fourth act is speculative and involves
exploring different possible future scenarios and potential solutions. Our starting
point imagines a future in which the reliability of the diagnostic ML is high
enough that the human physician seems unnecessary or even-to the extent she
may overrule valid diagnoses-unhelpful insofar as her inputs tend to reduce the
probability of a successful outcome. We consider technological fixes in response
to an ML monoculture and whether better liability rules might avoid or at least
postpone the problem. One complicating factor that we must consider is that law is
not the only driver here: even without the malpractice push, if the price is right,
economics could incentivize a very similar evolution. In either case, it is essential
to examine several potential means of avoiding the risks associated with an ML
diagnostic monoculture and an over-reliance on ML.
If we are correct that tort law will provide the wrong incentives, the
question is what one can or should do about it. Countries with national health
systems featuring strong centralized control might find an administrative method
of overcoming the problems we describe. But in the United States, in which both
medical service provision and insurance remain relatively decentralized, the tort
system-malpractice law-serves as an important source of incentives and thus de
facto regulation of medical service provision. A possible legal strategy would be to
change existing medical malpractice rules and thus reduce the incentives that drive
medicine to reduce its reliance on people. We propose meaningful human
participation in diagnostics as an essential requirement of the standard of care.
This will blunt the legal aspect of the push toward replacing physicians with ML.
Furthermore, as probabilistically superior AIs come to work alongside
humans, we must find ways to combat malpractice law's tendency to stay the
human's hand in individual cases: if a physician overrides the machine, the
physician (and his or her employer) will be taking a terrible malpractice risk if it
remains the case that the machine has a significantly better probability of success
on its own then does the physician. We thus will also need to formulate new rules
that balance the social interest of having human judgment in the loop with the
individual patient's interest in getting the best outcome. However, this requires
that we consider thorny ethical and legal issues. Unless we are very confident in
our technical solutions, we argue, there is a strong case for altering existing
medical liability rules to maintain focus-when it comes to determining the
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appropriate role of humans and machines in medical diagnostics-on both ethics"
and cost rather than defensive medicine. A revision of the standard of care to avoid
allowing a machine-only diagnostic regime would require meaningful participation
by people in the loop. As such, it risks being expensive because the machine will
cost money and the rule we propose will negate potential cost savings from
reducing the number of physicians in reliance on the new technology. However,
we suggest that our proposal could be a first step in preventing law from
overriding these other important considerations, preserving many long-term
beneficial outcomes that would otherwise be at risk due to pressure from the legal
system and from cost-cutting.
I. ONCE A MACHINE LEARNING SYSTEM IS DEMONSTRABLY
SUPERIOR, MALPRACTICE LAW WILL REQUIRE THAT MEDICAL
SERVICE PROVIDERS USE IT
It seems inevitable that-at least for some medical specialties-ML
diagnosticians someday will have demonstrably better success rates than human
physicians. A number of ongoing initiatives suggest that ML will have, or perhaps
already has,'2 great diagnostic power for a variety of diseases and conditions
ranging from oncology to drug discovery. Google's neural net diagnoses skin
cancer as effectively as do experienced dermatologists.13 Google has tested an Al-
based system that successfully identified eye diseases in retinal fundus
photographs'4 and one that reaches or exceeds that of experts on a variety of sight-
11. See Jason Millar & Ian Kerr, Delegation, Relinquishment, and
Responsibility: The Prospect of Expert Robots in ROBOT LAW 102, 115 (Ryan Calo, A.
Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016).
12. See Ian Steadman, IBM's Watson Is Better at Diagnosing Cancer than
Human Doctors, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ibm-watson-
medical-doctor.
13. See Andre Esteva et al. Dermatologist-Level Classification of Skin Cancer
with Deep Neural Networks, 542 NATURE 115, 118 (2017), doi: 10.1038/nature21056. But
see Zachary C. Lipton & Jacob Steinhardt, Troubling Trends in Machine Learning
Scholarship, ARXWV:1807.03341 (July 27, 2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1807.03341 ("The
comparison to dermatologists conceals the fact that classifiers and dermatologists perform
fundamentally different tasks. Real dermatologists encounter a wide variety of
circumstances and must perform their jobs despite unpredictable changes. The machine
classifier, however, only achieves low error on [static] test data.").
14. Varun Gulshan et al., Development and Validation of a Deep Learning
Algorithm for Detection of Diabetic Retinopathy in Retinal Fundus Photographs, 316 J. AM.
MED. Assoc. 2402, 2402 (2016), doi:10.1001/jama.2016.17216; see also Ariel Bleicher,
Teenage Whiz Kid Invents an Al System to Diagnose Her Grandfather's Eye Disease, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Aug. 3, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-
os/biomedical/diagnostics/teenage-whiz-kid-invents-an-ai-system-to-diagnose-her-
grandfaters-eye-disease (describing creation of "Eyeagnosis, a smartphone app plus 3D-
printed lens that seeks to change the diagnostic procedure from a 2-hour exam requiring a
multi-thousand-dollar retinal imager to a quick photo snap with a phone").
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threatening retinal diseases. " Other programs already beat humans: an Al beat
humans at predicting heart attacks-without even considering the effects of
diabetes or lifestyle.16 A different Al beat humans at diagnosing brain tumors and
predicting hematoma expansion.'7 So too with predicting certain heart diseases:
"Machine-learning significantly improves accuracy of cardiovascular risk
prediction, increasing the number of patients identified who could benefit from
preventive treatment, while avoiding unnecessary treatment of others."'18
Researchers at MIT and Harvard are using ML for Alzheimer detection. 19
Meanwhile, "Chinese researchers have developed an artificial intelligence system
which can diagnose cancerous prostate samples as accurately as any pathologist."2
A deep-learning system using convolutional neural networks, trained with 100,000
images, found 95% of melanomas in a study, while human dermatologists only
found 86.6% of them.2' Similarly,
Watson for Drug Discovery rank ordered all of the nearly 1,500 genes
within the human genome and proposed predictions regarding which
genes might be associated with ALS. . . . [E]ight of the top 10 ranked
genes proved to be linked to the disease. More significantly, the study
found five never before linked genes associated with ALS.22
15. Jeffrey De Fauw et al., Clinically Applicable Deep Learning For Diagnosis
and Referral In Retinal Disease, 24 NATURE MED. 1342, 1348 (2018), doi: 10.1038/s41591-
018-0107-6 (noting that training data was only 14,884 scans).
16. Lulu Chang, Machine Learning Algorithms Surpass Doctors at Predicting
Heart Attacks, DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 17, 2017, 6:21 AM),
http://www.digitaltrends .com/health-fitness/ai-algorithm-heart-attack/.
17. For the brain tumors the BioMind Al system "made correct diagnoses in 87
percent of 225 cases in about 15 minutes, while a team of 15 senior doctors only achieved
66-percent accuracy;" it correctly predicted the hematomas 83% of the time while the
humans only managed a 63% accuracy rate. Xinhua, China Focus: Al beats human doctors
in neuroimaging recognition contest, XINHUANET (June 6, 2018),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/30/c_137292451 .htm.
18. Stephen F. Weng et al., Can Machine-Learning Improve Cardiovascular
Risk Prediction Using Routine Clinical Data?, 12 PLOS ONE e0174944, Apr. 4, 2017, at 2,
https://doi.org/10.1371/j ournal.pone.0174944.
19. See Predicting Change in the Alzheimer's Brain, MIT CSAIL (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://www.csail.mit.edu/predicting-change-in the alzheimers brain; Adrian V. Dalca et
al., Predictive Modeling of Anatomy with Genetic and Clinical Data, MIT (2015),
http://www.mit.edu/-adalca/files/papers/miccai20l5_predictiveModelling-precr.pdf.
20. Science Business Reporting, Artificial Intelligence Can Diagnose Prostate
Cancer as Well as a Pathologist, SCIENCEIBUSINESS (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://sciencebusiness.net/healthy-measures/news/artificial-intelligence-can-diagnose-
prostate-cancer-well-pathologist.
21. H. A. Haenssle et al., Man Against Machine: Diagnostic Performance of a
Deep Learning Convolutional Neural Network for Dermoscopic Melanoma Recognition in
Comparison to 58 Dermatologists, 29 ANNALS ONCOLOGY 1836, 1839 (2018),
doi: 10.1093/annonc/mdyl66. The 58 human dermatologists came from 17 countries; just
over half were "expert"-level, but 29% had less than two years' experience. Id. at 1838-39.
22. Barrow Identifies New Genes Responsible for ALS using IBM Watson
Health, CISION (Dec. 14, 2016, 12:30 PM), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-
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Diagnostic medicine seems a particularly good fit for what today's AIs can do
best-pattern recognition-as well as being an area with real room for
improvement. Five percent of U.S. adults who seek outpatient care each year
experience a diagnostic error, leading to 6%-17% of adverse events in hospitals.23
Radiology seems to be a specialty particularly suited to replacement by
ML.24 One study reports that an Al correctly detected 92.4% of breast-cancer
tumors compared to the 73.2% detected correctly by human doctors.25 Indeed
University of Toronto Professor Geoffrey Hinton argues that radiologists are about
to be obsolete:
I think that if you work as a radiologist you are like Wile E. Coyote in the
cartoon .... You're already over the edge of the cliff, but you haven't yet
looked down. There's no ground underneath. . . . It's just completely
obvious that in five years deep learning is going to do better than
radiologists.26
Some radiologists vehemently disagree, because "radiologists do not just look at
pictures.'2 7 Hyperbole notwithstanding, many ML experts share Hinton's vision
releases/barrow-identifies-new-genes-responsible-for-als-using-ibm-watson-health-
300378211 .html.
23. See Nicolas P. Terry, Appification, Al, and Healthcare's New Iron Triangle,
21 J. HEALTH CARE POL'Y 117, 174 (2018) (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING
DIAGNOSIS IN HEALTH CARE) (2015)), doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3020784.
24. See Katie Chockley & Ezekiel Emanuel, The End of Radiology? Three
Threats to the Future Practice of Radiology, 13 J. AM. COLL. RADIOL. 1415, 1417-19.
(2016), doi: 10.1016/j.jacr.2016.07.010.
25. Yun Liu et al., Detecting Cancer Metastases on Gigapixel Pathology Images,
ARXrV: 1703.02442 [Cs] (Mar. 8, 2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.02442 (stating "[a]t 8 false
positives per image, we detect 92.4% of the tumors, relative to 82.7% by the previous best
automated approach. For comparison, a human pathologist attempting exhaustive search
achieved 73.2% sensitivity"). Currently, however, the ML system's false-positive rate
remains greater than that of humans. See Dayong Wang et al, Deep Learning for Identifying
Metastatic Breast Cancer, ARXIv (June 18, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.05718.pdf.
26. Siddhartha Mukherjee, A.L Versus M.D., NEW YORKER (Apr. 3, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/03/ai-versus-md.
27. "[W]ithout radiologists, a hospital simply cannot function." Hugh Harvey,
Why Al Will Not Replace Radiologists, TOWARDS DATA SC. (Mar. 11, 2018),
https://towardsdatascience.com/why-ai-will-not-replace-radiologists-c7736f2c7d80; see
also Will Knight, Google X-Ray Project Shows Ai Won't Replace Doctors Any Time Soon,
MIT TECH. REvw (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610552/google-
x-ray-project-shows-ai-wont-replace-doctors-any-time-soon/. On the other hand, ML is
making inroads into the radiological treatment process also. See Ian Sample, 'It's Going to
Create a Revolution': How Al is Transforming the NHS, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2018),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/04/its-going-create-revolution-how-ai-
transforming-nhs (describing use of IBM's "InnerEye" system to markup scans
automatically for prostate-cancer patient, saving time and-it is hoped but not yet proved-
increasing quality of treatment).
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regarding the inevitable demise of human medical diagnosis for conditions where
we have large amounts of high-quality data.
28
IBM promoted Watson as using oncological data to diagnose cancers that
humans have difficulty identifying.29 Skeptics point to issues with current trials
and suggest that ML superiority remains purely speculative,30 and that IBM's
advertising over-promises what Watson can do.3' Oren Etzioni, CEO of the Allen
Institute for Al, went as far as to say that "IBM Watson is the Donald Trump of the
Al industry-outlandish claims that aren't backed by credible data.'32 Indeed,
IBM Watson's "Oncology Expert Advisor" suffered a high-profile setback when
the University of Texas's cancer center canceled a flagship collaboration because
the project foundered on incompatibilities with the hospital records system as well
as alleged violations of hospital procurement regulations.3 In the end, the "project
appeared to fall apart because of cost overruns related to incompatible IT platforms
and the extraordinarily complex work involved in structuring and preparing
massive amounts of data to be ingested by Watson's machine learning systems.
' ' 34
Even a state-of-the-art Al was no match for "the idiosyncrasies of medical records:
the acronyms, human errors, shorthand phrases, and different styles of writing."35
28. See, e.g., Chockley & Emanuel, supra note 24.
29. See Steve Lohr, IBM Is Counting on Its Bet on Watson, and Paying Big
Money for It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/technology/ibm-is-counting-on-its-bet-on-watson-and-
paying-big-money-for-it.html.
30. See, e.g., Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM Pitched Watson as a Revolution in
Cancer Care. It's Nowhere Close, STAT (Sept. 5, 2017),
https ://www.statnews.com/2017/09/05/watson-ibm-cancer/.
31. A particularly egregious example is IBM, Watson at Work, YouTUBE (Feb.
10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7zKLEyLTqNU, in which "Watson" has a
dialog with basketball scouts on the court-although reportedly, the Toronto Raptors are in
fact using a version of Watson to help them rank scouted players based on various
numerical metrics. See IBM, Seeing Things the Other Teams Can't is the Key to Victory,
https://www.ibm.com/watson/stories/ca-en/basketball-with-watson.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2018).
32. Jennings Brown, Why Everyone Is Hating on IBM Watson Including the
People Who Helped Make It, GIZMODO (Aug. 10, 2017) (quoting Oren Etzioni),
http://gizmodo.com/why-everyone-is-hating-on-watson-including-the-people-w-
1797510888.
33. See Matthew Herper, MD Anderson Benches IBM Watson in Setback for
Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/02/19/md-anderson-benches-ibm-
watson-in-setback-for-artificial-intelligence-in-medicine.
34. John Battelle, A Trio of Tech Takedowns, NEwCo SHIFT (July 17, 2017),
https://shift.newco.co/a-trio-of-tech-takedowns-b931c0df5ef6; see also Herper, supra note
33.
35. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM's Watson Supercomputer Recommended
'Unsafe and Incorrect' Cancer Treatments, Internal Documents Show, STAT (July 25,
2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/25/ibm-watson-recommended-unsafe-incorrect-
treatments/; see also B L Holman et al., Medical impact of unedited preliminary radiology
reports., 191 RADIOLOGY 519, 520 (1994), doi: 10.1148/radiology.191.2.8153332 (reporting
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Watson's Sloan Kettering system apparently erred badly, engineers said,
exhibiting "multiple examples of unsafe and incorrect treatment
recommendations" due to faulty synthetic (hypothetical rather than real patient)
training data.36 IBM defends its Watson program by pointing to other successes,
particularly in Watson for Genomics.37
There is no question that Watson has enjoyed a friendly press and
significant hype.38 It is also the case that not everything IBM currently markets as
"Watson" is true ML. For example, "Watson for Oncology" has been touted as
giving "the same recommendations as professional oncologists in 99 percent of the
cases" in a test at the University of North Carolina.3 9 But the program is really a
decision-support tool enhanced with preprogrammed suggestions based on what a
committee of doctors at Sloan Kettering said they would do when presented with
various symptoms and scenarios.40 And it is also likely that some diagnostic
problems can be solved with simpler ordinary non-ML models that predict as well
or almost as well as ML while enabling much greater transparency as to the
reasons for a diagnosis.4'
that 5.4% of unedited radiology reports examined had significant errors, and that even after
editing 1.8% would have caused either unnecessary testing or actual danger to patients);
Hugh Harvey, Synoptic Reporting Makes Better Radiologists, and Algorithms, MEDrUM
(Mar. 25, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/synoptic-reporting-makes-better-
radiologists-and-algorithms-9755f3da51la (discussing ease with which errors creep into
medical records, especially those generated from free text and natural-language parsing).
36. Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 35.
37. See John E. Kelly I1, Watson Health: Setting the Record Straight, WATSON
HEALTH PERSP. (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson-health/setting-the-
record-straight/.
38. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, MD Anderson Cancer Center's IBM Watson
Project Fails, and so Did the Journalism Related to It, HEALTHNEwsREVIFW.ORG (Feb. 23,
2017), https://www.healthnewsreview.org/2017/02/md-anderson-cancer-centers-ibm-
watson-project-fails-journalism-related/. Internal IBM documents reveal that doctors were
livid about Watson's performance: "This product is a piece of shit," a doctor at Florida's
Jupiter Hospital said to IBM. "We bought it for marketing and with hopes that you would
achieve the vision. We can't use it for most cases." Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 35.
39. Ben Dickson, How Artificial Intelligence Is Revolutionizing Healthcare,
NEXT WEB (Apr. 13, 2017), https://thenextweb.com/artificial-
intelligence/2017/04/13/artificial-intelligence-revolutionizing-healthcare/.
40. "That training does not teach Watson to base its recommendations on the
outcomes of these patients, whether they lived, or died or survived longer than similar
patients. Rather, Watson makes its recommendations based on the treatment preferences of
Memorial Sloan Kettering physicians." Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 30.
41. See Cynthia Rudin & Berk Ustun, Optimized Scoring System: Towards Trust
in Machine Learning for Healthcare and Criminal Justice, 48 INTERFACES 449 (2018).
Rudin and Ustun argue that if models that are given a choice between a black-box ML
model and a non-ML model "that is so simple it can fit on an index card" we might prefer
the simpler, more transparent model even if it can only "predict almost equally well." Id. at
450. That may be a persuasive argument in the criminal-justice context, which is
constrained by Due Process concerns among others; it is less obvious in the medical system
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However, we should not allow the real ML wheat to be obscured by the
marketing chaff. ML systems are being used for everything from dress designing
to cooking, roadside assistance, business messaging, education, and movie
direction.42 In April 2018, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved
IDx-DR for sale, making it the first-ever Al-based software approved to detect
diabetic retinopathy.43 Notably, "JDx-DR is the first device authorized for
marketing that provides a screening decision without the need for a clinician to
also interpret the image or results, which makes it usable by healthcare providers
who may not normally be involved in eye care."44 Meanwhile, researchers are
using ML systems, including Watson, to find tumors in radiological data,45 making
these the paradigmatic examples of the genre.
A. Machine Learning
1. ML Algorithms Today
At their core, ML systems are simply algorithms designed to draw on data
to answer questions .4 6 Depending on the design of the algorithm, and the type and
amount of data available, an ML system can answer very simple questions, such as
predicting the expected weight gain for a patient receiving a given medication or
more complex questions, such as analyzing brain scans and delineating the
location of a tumor.
47
The basic components of an ML system include:
* Input: The training examples fed into the algorithm. The examples are
described by a set of features-e.g., doctors' notes, clinical results, time-series
recordings, images, etc.-that the machine will observe.
48
* ML Algorithm: The computer program that will digest the data and make a
prediction-e.g., linear regression, neural networks, decision trees. We
include in this component both the computer's representation of the
knowledge extracted and the optimization routine used to train the
representation.
49
where medical ethics, patients, and the tort system all create very great pressures to choose
the technology that is demonstrably best. Id. at 449-50.
42. Will Knight, IBM's Watson Is Everywhere But What Is It?, MIT TECH.
REv. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602744/ibms-watson-is-
everywhere-but-what-is-it/.
43. Press Release, FDA, FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial Intelligence-Based
Device to Detect Certain Diabetes-Related Eye Problems (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm604357.htm.
44. Id.
45. See Chockley & Emanuel, supra note 24.
46. See CHRISTOPHER BISHOP, PATTERN RECOGNITION AND MACHINE LEARNING 1
(2006).
47. See Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know About Machine
Learning, 55 COMM. ACM 78, 78 (2012), doi: 10.1145/2347736.2347755.
48. See BISHOP, supra note 46, at 2.
49. Id. at5.
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* Output: The information that is produced by the algorithm for given
examples-e.g., predicted weight gain, tumor location, primary health
outcome, recommended treatment s rategy, prescribed medication dosage.50
* Evaluation: The criteria by which we measure the algorithm's performance-
e.g., classification accuracy, prediction error, false-positive rate.5'
In this Article, we distinguish between ML systems that make predictions
and ML systems that make interventions. Most of the components may be very
similar in both cases, so the distinction is primarily in terms of the output.
Prediction-type ML systems produce outputs designed to inform medical
personnel and enhance their knowledge, situational awareness, and understanding,
which they can incorporate in their own decision-making about treatment strategy.
Intervention-type ML systems produce outputs that are actionable and can be
applied directly, such as a request for a clinical test, a prescription, or in some
cases a direct intervention. Examples of interventions include the case of a neuro-
stimulation device using ML to decide the timing and intensity of electrical
stimulation applied to a patient with epilepsy in hopes of reducing the incidence of
seizures,12 or an artificial pancreas using ML to adapt the dosage of an implanted
insulin pump on a diabetic patient.53
While from a technical perspective Prediction-type ML and Intervention-
type ML can be built using analogous technology and data, the distinction between
them is potentially important in the context of discussing medical malpractice law
because of the different degrees of human intervention that occur before the ML
output is applied to a patient. It might seem obvious that a human's liability for
relying on ML will be greater in the Intervention-ML scenario than in the mere
Prediction-ML scenario. After all, if ML is only being used for prediction, there
clearly is a human in the loop making the treatment decision rather than-dare we
say-mechanically following the dictates of the Intervention-ML. However, in our
view the liability distinction between the two is less sharp than it may seem: if the
downstream human's reliance on the Prediction-ML was the source of the patient's
bad outcome, but this reliance was reasonable given the Prediction-ML's track
record or its being part of the standard of care, then the liability of the human
under the Prediction system may be no greater than under the Intervention system.
50. See id. at 2.
51. Id. at32.
52. See Ali Hossam Shoeb, Application of Machine Learning to Epileptic
Seizure Onset Detection and Treatment, MIT (2009),
https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/54669.
53. See Melanie Katrin Bothe et al., The Use of Reinforcement Learning to Meet
the Challenges of an Artificial Pancreas, 10 EXPERT REv. MED. DEVICES 661, 661 (2013),
doi: 10.1586/17434440.2013.827515; Eric Wicklund, Can Watson Help mHealth Predict
Health Emergencies?, MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 22, 2016),
https://mhealthintelligence.com/news/can-watson-help-mhealth-predict-health-emergencies;
FDA approves clinical testing of Al-powered bionic pancreas for diabetes, Sci. SERV. (May
29, 2018), https://www.dr-hempel-network.com/digital-health-technolgy/beta-bionic-ai-
powered-bionic-pancreas-for-diabetes/.
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Neural networks are but one type of ML algorithms designed to answer
questions using data. Earlier methods, including linear regression, decision trees,
and simple probabilistic models, have been used for years to make predictions.54
Currently, researchers are making particularly rapid progress in training neural
networks, especially those with many layers ("deep learning"), to recognize
increasingly complex patterns in data.55 Neural networks are now the method of
choice to analyze high-dimensional data, including images of all types, sound, and
natural-language text.5 6 Their power resides in their ability to extract patterns from
large data sets with relatively little prior knowledge about useful features or
variables.57
A critical element of deep learning is that it trains synthetic neurons in
multiple layers, both of which extract information at different levels of
abstraction.58 One can think of each neuron as a simple unit of computation
(typically performing a linear equation, followed by a non-linear transform).59
Groups of neurons are assembled into layers; each neuron in a layer is in
communication with the ones in the layer above it; each successive layer tends to
learn to recognize more general features of the network's input .6' The neurons in
the very first layer observe the Input (raw) data. The neurons in the final layer are
responsible for producing the Output.
61
A common denominator of all ML algorithms, including neural networks,
is that they require training. Training methods vary, but they all depend on access
to a sufficient-and usually quite large62 -body of accurate training data. For
tumor detection, the data set might be a set of input images, along with the
annotations from expert radiologists about the target output-e.g., simple
tumor/no-tumor classification, or a detailed tumor-contour segmentation.63 The
fact that the images come with a human-annotated label is crucial.' The ML
54. See TOM MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING 15 (1997).
55. See generally Yoshua Bengio, Aaron Courville & Pascal Vincent,
Representation Learning: A Review and New Perspectives, 35 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
PATTERN ANALYSIS & MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 1798 (2013), doi: 10.1109/TPAMI.2013.50.
56. See IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP
LEARNING 19 (2016).
57. Id.
58. A more formal description appears in David E. Rumelhart, Geoffrey E.
Hinton & Ronald J. Williams, Learning Representations by Back-Propagating Errors, 323
NATURE 533, 533 (1986), doi: 10.1038/323533a0.
59. See GOODFELLOW, BENGIO & COURVILLE, supra note 56, at 165.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Prakash Jay, Transfer Learning Using Keras Towards Data Science,
MEDIUM (Apr. 15, 2017), https://medium.com/towards-data-science/transfer-learning-using-
keras-d804b2e04ef8 (noting that with "small" datasets of under 40,000 examples "it is
difficult to achieve decent accuracy" for computer vision problems).
63. See Perelman School of Medicine, Multimodal Brain Tumor Segmentation
Challenge 2017, SBIA, http://braintumorsegmentation.org/ (last visited Jan 29, 2018).
64. Some ML algorithms are trained by unsupervised learning, i.e., by
recognizing patterns using test data that has not been labeled, classified, or categorized by
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algorithm relies on having that pairing between Input and Output in the data, and
the process of "training" the ML system corresponds to the computer learning how
to set its own representation so as to reliably select a good output for any new
input it might observe.65 A key component of the training procedure is to assess
the expertise level of the ML algorithm throughout raining. This is typically done
by keeping a portion of the data-e.g., 10%-aside as a "validation set," against
which the results of the training will be evaluated using the specified Evaluation
criteria.
66
Another significant feature for our purposes is that neural network
systems are rarely static. Even after the successful processing of the initial training
data, there are many reasons why one would want to give a deep learning ML
additional data to digest.67 The most obvious is that additional data offers the
possibility of better predictions.6 This is true when the new data is simply a
greater quantity of the same type of data-e.g., more x-rays graded by experts-
and when assuming the data comes from the same distribution-i.e., collected in
the same way, annotated in the same way, from the same type of patients.
However, it is not inevitably the case that more data is always better; in particular,
data collected from a different hospital, potentially with slight variations in
procedure, may confuse the ML system. It is important to be vigilant about the
quality of the data used to train the system and, in particular, to ensure that the data
used for training is collected under the same conditions as the ML system will be
used in practice.69 If the inputs from which the ML is to make its decision change
in some way over time, the deep-learning system will need to be retrained with
new representative data. Changes in data distribution are not uncommon and might
be due to quality degradation caused by aging equipment70 or quality
improvements resulting from the invention of better and more accurate data-
acquisition equipment-e.g., the invention of better-quality imaging machines.
Without representative examples of the new information, the Al will not be able to
make the best predictions from them7' and indeed could, in theory, go badly
wrong .72
Due to the very large number of variables, large neural networks are often
thought to have a black-box quality. In reality, it is possible to track very precisely
humans. Current state-of-the-art for these techniques still lags behind supervised learning,
which uses data tagged by humans, so we do not dwell on these approaches here.
65. See BISHOP, supra note 46, at 2.
66. Id. at 11.
67. See generally id.
68. Id. at6.
69. Id. at 9-10.
70. See ETHEM ALPAYDIN, INTRODUCTION TO MACHINE LEARNING 275 (2014).
71. See id. at 286.
72. See MASASHI SUGIYAMA & MOTOAKI KAWANABE, MACHINE LEARNING IN
NON-STATIONARY ENVIRONMENTS 3-19 (2012).
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the computation at each neuron and each layer.7" However, it is often difficult to
extract a simple explanation for the decision at the end layer (output), because it
depends on the combination of many small decisions by each neuron.74 This
highlights an important distinction: most ML algorithms have high traceability
(they run on a computer, and can be re-run several times to generate the same
results), but poor explainability (they cannot extract a compact narrative
explaining the logic behind their reasoning).75 In contrast, humans tend to have
poor traceability (difficult to track, at the neural level, reasons for our decisions),
but high interpretability (we can easily construct narratives to explain our
behaviors7 6). Neural networks, in particular, do not typically extract causal
relationships between inputs and outputs; therefore, it is important to interpret any
relationship between input and output as a predictive one, no matter how intuitive
such relationships might look on the surface.77
2. Our Assumptions About Tomorrow
For the purposes of this Article, we make two predictive assumptions: one
about Al's capabilities and one about its limits. Regarding Al's abilities, we
assume that at some future date-which may come soon-an ML will be shown to
be measurably superior to humans in some specialized aspect of diagnostic
medicine. We make this assumption because current trends point strongly in that
direction given ML's advances in tumor-detection78 as well as other areas.79 For
our purposes-and those of the legal system-a new diagnostic technique, such as
an ML system, is superior if its diagnostic accuracy is greater to a statistically
significant degree. For simplicity, we assume here that the ML system either
makes fewer false positives (Type-I errors) and no more false negatives80 (Type-II
errors), or that it makes fewer false negatives and no more false positives, or that
73. See Dave Gershgorn, MIT Researchers Can Now Track AI's Decisions Back
to Single Neurons, QUARTZ (July 11, 2017), https://qz.com/1022156/mit-researchers-can-
now-track-artificial-intelligences-decisions-back-to-single-neurons/.
74. See Bengio, Courville & Vincent, supra note 55, at 1803.
75. See Leilani H. Gilpin, David Ban, Ben Z. Yuan, Ayesha Bajwa, Michael
Specter & Lalana Kagal, Explaining Explanations: An Approach to Evaluating
Interpretability of Machine Learning, ARXrv: 1806.00069 (2018),
https://arxiv.org/abs/I 806.00069.
76. However, that those narratives are in fact accurate ought not to be assumed.
See Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability, ARXiv:1606.03490 (Mar. 6,
2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.03490 (noting "black box nature of human brain").
77. See Cary Conglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEo. L.J. 1147, 1173 (2017); CATHY
O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 87 (2016); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box
SOCIETY (2015).
78. Chockley & Emanuel, supra note 24.
79. For example, ML has made significant progress advancing computer vision,
speech recognition, and machine translation. See supra text accompanying notes 12-26.
80. Unsurprisingly, false negatives are the errors most likely to create
malpractice claims in radiology. See Antonio Pinto & Luca Brunses, Spectrum of
Diagnostic Errors in Radiology, 2 WORLD J. RADIOL. 377, 377 (2010), doi:
10.4329/wjr.v2.il0.377.
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the ML system improves on humans to a statistically significant extent in both
types of error.8'
It is also likely that even if an ML system has a better success rate than
the average human doctor, ML and humans combined might be even better.
8 2
There are some reasons to suspect that today the combination might beat either one
alone, as is the case in "centaur chess."83 We also know that, at present, neural
networks can make confident but erroneous identifications that no human would
make.84 Keeping a human around protects against those obvious errors and might
protect against other kinds of errors as well.
Indeed, if machine + human is demonstrably better than machine alone,
then the combination should become the standard of care through the ordinary
operation of the legal system without the need for external intervention unless the
combination is seen as prohibitively expensive.85 At least until ML gets very good,
there are scenarios in which the human doctor's role evolves more than evaporates.
If ML makes prediction and correlation cheaper, that arguably increases the value
of other inputs.
However, even in this scenario machine + human remains the standard of
care only so long as AI technology does not improve to where the ML system
alone is as good at some activity as machine + human. At that point, we posit, the
ML system alone becomes, or suffices to meet, the standard of care for that
81. It is also possible that malpractice law might determine that an ML system
that made substantially fewer false-negative diagnoses but also a small number of increased
false positives was legally superior either on its own or in conjunction with a human
diagnostician, but we need not consider that distracting case to make our argument.
82. For context, see infra text accompanying notes 324-31.
83. "The best chess players in the world are human-machine teams"-so long as
teams are not time-limited for moves. PAUL SCHARRE, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. CENTURY,
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND OPERATIONAL RISK 39 (2016).
84. See Anh Nguyen, Jason Yosinski & Jeff Clune, Deep Neural Networks are
Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images, 4 IEEE COMP.
VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION 427 (2015) (discussing "a project that used neural
networks to predict the probability of death for patients with pneumonia, so that low-risk
patients could be treated as outpatients. The results were generally more accurate than those
that came from handcrafted models that applied known rules to the data. But the neural
network clearly indicated that asthmatic pneumonia patients are at low risk of dying and
thus should be treated as outpatients. This contradicts what caregivers know, as well as
common sense. It turns out that the finding was caused by the fact that asthmatic patients
with pneumonia are immediately put into intensive care units, resulting in excellent survival
rates"); see also David Weinberger, Alien Knowledge, WIRED: BACKCHANNEL (Apr. 18,
2017), https:/Ibackchannel.com/our-machines-now-have-knowledge-well-never-understand-
857a479dcc0e.
85. For an interesting description of a user-centered design intended to overcome
physician reluctance to consult an Al, see Cliff Kuang, An Ingenious Approach to
Designing AI that Doctors Trust, Co.DESIGN (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.fastcodesign.com/90157144/an-ingenious-approach-to-designing-ai-that-
doctors-trust (describing work of Prof. John Zimmerman on decision support for cardiac
surgeons).
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activity-e.g., diagnosis-and the problems discussed below all reappear, making
a policy intervention necessary. Perhaps at that point humans will need to switch to
other activities such as "the application of ethics, and for emotional support"-and
indeed, if ML allows us to diagnose and treat more diseases, the demand for those
activities could increase.
8 6
Conversely, for simplicity, we assume that he diagnostic specialty in
which the Al excels is one that ordinarily takes place away from the point of care,
or if it is at the point of care forms only a part of the care-provider's diagnostic
responsibilities. This second assumption allows us to assume that there will still be
a physician present at the point of care, e.g., an oncologist who ordinarily would be
informed by consulting with a radiologist but instead turns to an ML system.87 In
so doing we can avoid engaging, at least for now, with long-standing medical-
ethics debates about the appropriateness of fully robotic care.88
As set out in the next Section, once ML diagnostics are statistically
superior to humans, it will only be a short while before legal systems, including in
the United States, treat machine diagnosis as the "standard of care." That
designation will mean that any physician or hospital failing to use machine
diagnosis without a good excuse will be running a substantial risk of malpractice
liability if the patient is incorrectly diagnosed.89 In a fairly short time, every
insurance company and every hospital will require the use of ML, at least as an
assistant o physicians, because failure to do so will be actionable in the event of a
bad outcome. There are some variables that might alter how quickly this will
happen: notably cost and whether courts continue to make distinctions between
types of practices and types of practice situations, e.g., teaching hospitals versus
rural hospitals versus sole practitioners. But these are primarily questions of speed
and detail rather than of trend. In fairly short order, it seems highly plausible that
ML systems will be prescribed not by doctors but by tort law for certain forms of
diagnosis and that medical service providers will comply. And, if an ML system
86. Ajay Agawal, Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb, The Simple Economics of
Machine Intelligence, HARV. Bus. REv. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/1 /the-simple-
economics-of-machine-intelligence.
87. One very substantial difference between consulting with a human oncologist
and "consulting" with a computerized system is that there is no opportunity for any
discussion or give and take. An Al gives a report but can neither explain it nor alter it in
light of reasoned argument. This could be a real loss to the quality of care, although it is
possible that increasing reliance on electronic health records as means of communication
between specialists has already eroded those conversations and relationships.
88. The so-called Standard View of biomedical ethics holds "that the practice of
medicine and nursing are ineluctably human." KENNETH W. GOODMAN, ETHICS, MEDICINE,
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 26 (2015) (citing R.A. Miller, Why the Standard View is
Standard: People, Not Machines, Understand Patient's' Problems, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 581,
581 (1990)).
89. See Patricia Kuszler, Telemedicine and Integrated Health Care Delivery:
Compounding Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 297, 316-17 (1999); Kori M.
Klustaitis, Dr. Watson Will See You Now: How the Use of IBM's Newest Supercomputer Is
Changing the Field of Medical Diagnostics and Potential Implications for Medical
Malpractice, 5 BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL L. REv. 88, 101-02 (2011-2012).
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proves statistically superior for treatment, then a similar argument will also apply.
In which case, hospitals and other medical service providers will carry out Al-
recommended treatment plans unless there is a very clear reason to do otherwise.
B. How Tort Law Incorporates Technical Change
Medical malpractice law is a species of negligence law, which itself is a
type of tort, a civil wrong.90 Physicians can commit malpractice by failing to get
informed consent (an issue not especially relevant here), or by breaching their duty
to provide the appropriate standard of care in a manner that causes injury to the
patient.9' Defining the relevant standard of care is thus a central issue in many
malpractice cases.
92
The standard of care for a doctor is, at the most general evel, that of a
reasonably competent physician,93 i.e., one who uses a reasonable degree of care
and skill.94 While there can of course be evidentiary issues as to what a physician
actually did, in cases that involve whether a physician should have used a
particular, relatively new technology there can also be complicated questions as to
whether the use of the new technology-or the failure to use the new technology-
is itself negligence.95 Using new technology also may invite claims that perhaps
the people who used it were not yet sufficiently familiar with it and thus used it
improperly. 96
U.S. tort law recognizes that echnology changes what is possible and
reasonable, and thus the general standard of care for professions and trades may
change too.97 Indeed, where once "custom" -what most people in the trade or
profession do and have generally done-was the starting point for measuring the
appropriate standard of care, U.S. courts today are somewhat suspicious of
custom-based arguments on the theory that these arguments provide too little
incentive to modernize and may favor entrenched modes of service provision at the
expense of the victim.98
This modernizing tendency traces back at least as far as the oft-cited T.J.
Hooper case, where Judge Learned Hand ruled that it was negligent for a tugboat
sailing the Atlantic in 1928 to fail to have a working radio on board to hear storm-
weather warnings.99 The trial court had found that if the T.J. Hooper had carried a
90. "Professional negligence is commonly called malpractice." VICTOR
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 183
(13th ed. 2015) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1979)).
91. See id. at 188, 201-02.
92. See id. at 190 (citing Boyce v. Brown, 77 P.2d 455 (Ariz. 1938)).
93. See id. at 188 (citing Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)).
94. See id. at 193.
95. See id. at 193-94; Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979).
96. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 90, at 198.
97. See id. at 189-91 (citing Boyce v. Brown, 77 P.2d 455 (Ariz. 1938)).
98. See id. at 161-64 (citing Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1982)).
99. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.).
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radio, it likely would not have foundered.' On appeal, Judge Hand first noted that
there was no general and established custom of carrying a radio among coastwise
carriers, and he admitted that courts sometimes treated the absence of such a
custom as a full defense.101 But he also noted that a suitable radio was not
expensive10 2 and that custom should not be definitive:
[A] whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however
persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is
required; there are precautions so imperative that even their
universal disregard will not excuse their omission. But here there
was no custom at all as to receiving sets; some had them, some did
not; the most that can be urged is that they had not yet become
general. Certainly in such a case we need not pause; when some
have thought a device necessary, at least we may say that they were
right, and the others too slack.
10 3
The rule in T.J. Hooper has, to some extent, been subsumed into more
general negligence rules about how to balance the cost of prevention against
expected benefits or risks. These modern rules ar  often traced to another Learned
Hand opinion, in the even more celebrated Carroll Towing case.104 This case gave
rise to the so-called Hand Formula in which the test for negligence is whether the
cost of a precaution would be more or less than the expected value of the gain in
safety.1' Then-Professor Richard Posner identified Carroll Towing as "one of the
few attempts to give content to the deceptively simple concept of ordinary care." 1
06
Since The T.J. Hooper and Carroll Towing, U.S. courts have not been shy
about demanding additional precautions where the likely benefits seemed to
outweigh the costs even when an industry resisted theml 7 -except in the case of
medicine, where until recently the courts have been more cautious.
C. Medical Variations: Custom and Localities
To succeed in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must show that his
or her injury, more likely than not, resulted from the treating physician's departure
from "the generally recognized and accepted practices and procedures that would
100. The T.J. Hooper, 53 F.2d 107, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), aff'd 60 F.2d 737 (2d
Cir. 1932).
101. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740.
102. Id. at 739.
103. Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
104. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (L.
Hand, J.).
105. For a discussion of the origins of the Hand Formula as expressed in Carroll
Towing, see Stephen G. Gilles, United States v. Carroll Towing Co.: The Hand Formula's
Home Port, in TORTS STORIES 11 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugerman eds., 2003).
106. Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972).
107. See, e.g., Bimberg v. Northern Pacific Ry., 14 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Minn.
1944) ("Local usage and general custom, either singly or in combination, will not justify or
excuse negligence.").
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be followed by the average, competent physician in the defendant's field of
medicine under the same or similar circumstances."'0 8 What constitutes average
competence in a given field of medicine is a question of fact, for which parties
commonly offer expert testimony.'
09
In contrast, who makes up the set of comparable physicians is primarily
an issue of law."0 For many years, physicians, almost alone among professionals
and tradespeople, enjoyed two special protections from professional-negligence
liability, both relating to who counted as comparable: a heightened ability to plead
custom as a defense,"' and the "locality rule.""' 2 The effect of these two rules was
to insulate physicians from liability so long as they provided treatment no worse
than was common in their community."3 Because physicians were reluctant to
testify against their colleagues until fairly late in the twentieth century, these rules
worked to greatly limit malpractice claims. 114
1. The Waning of the Locality Rule
The locality rule reflected a judicial belief that it would be unfair to apply
a single standard of care to all physicians."5 Physicians vary as to their training
108. Hoard v. Roper Hosp., Inc., 694 S.E.2d 1, 4 (S.C. 2010); see also Pike v.
Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760 (N.Y. 1898). The basic elements of the tort of negligence are duty,
breach, causation, and injury.
109. "In most charges of negligence against professional persons, expert
testimony is required to establish what the reasonable practice is in the community. The
conduct of the defendant professional is adjudged by this standard. Without such expert
testimony a plaintiff cannot prove negligence." Getchell v. Mansfield, 489 P.2d. 953, 955
(Or. 1971).
110. See, e.g., Brune v. Belikoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968) (upholding
decision by trial court that, as a matter of law, relevant comparatives for specialist doctor
were national not local).
111. Tim Cramm, Arthur J. Hartz & Michael D. Green, Ascertaining Customary
Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 699, 699-
700 (2002) ("Medical malpractice law has long modified the ordinary tort duty of
reasonable care. Health care professionals must exercise the same care that other
professionals customarily exercise. Thus, the duty applied to medical professionals is a
purely factual one, unlike the normative 'reasonable care' standard invoked for non-
professionals."). But see Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous
World, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1999) (critiquing reliance on custom as a measure of
negligence).
112. See infra Subsection I.C.1.
113. See Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical
Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1193, 1234 n.133 (1992)
(collecting cases).
114. Dean William Prosser, for example, referred in the 1955 edition of his Torts
treatise to "[t]he well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has
been mentioned now and then in the decisions." WILLIAM PROSSER, TORTS § 31, at 134 (2d
ed. 1955).
115. See Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 132 (1880) (holding that defendant
small-town surgeon "was bound to possess that skill only which physicians and surgeons of
ordinary ability and skill, practising in similar localities, with opportunities for no larger
experience, ordinarily possess; and he was not bound to possess that high degree of art and
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and specialization, and also in their practice settings. A general practitioner should
not be expected to have the same skill as a specialist, at least in matters touching
on that specialty.116 A small, rural practice does not have access to the same
equipment as a large, urban teaching hospital;".7 many courts also seemed
influenced by the idea that it would be unfair to expect the prototypical rural
practitioner to be as up-to-date as someone affiliated with a major hospital."8
Precisely what the comparatives were varied slightly: other physicians with similar
training in the same or a similar community, or perhaps other physicians with
similar training in similar communities in the state. 9
Today the standard of care for physicians is increasingly national,
reflecting the relative standardization of medical training. Physicians continue to
be held to a varying standard depending on their training and type of practice, but
the standard applied to members of a given specialty is more or less uniform
nationally.'20 The standard of care is that established by the "relevant community,"
which is now understood to be the national group of practitioners in that
specialty. 121 To whatever the extent the locality rule lives on, it applies primarily to
general practitioners. 122
2. Custom in Medical Malpractice Meets Technological Change
U.S. courts have, at least until recently, tended to accept evidence of
customary practices as persuasive defenses against claims of medical
skill possessed by eminent surgeons in large cities, and making a specialty of the practice of
surgery").
116. See James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status Of "Locality Rule" in
Malpractice Action Against Physician Who Is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R.3d 1133 (1980).
117. "[C]ity doctors are likely to be more advanced than their rural counterparts,
teaching hospitals are more likely to employ the latest techniques and technologies than are
nonteaching hospitals." Mark F. Grady, Better Medicine Causes More Lawsuits, and New
Administrative Courts Will Not Solve the Problem, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1068, 1073 (1992)
(reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991)).
118. "The rule, in its early form, was demonstrably calculated to protect the rural
and small town practitioner, who was presumed to be less adequately informed and
equipped than his big city brother." Jon R. Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality
Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 408, 410 (1969).
119. See Scott A. Behrens, Note, Call in Houdini: The Time Has Come to Be
Released from the Geographic Straitjacket Known as the Locality Rule, 56 DRAKE L. REv.
753, 754-64 (2008) (tracing origins and evolution of the locality rule); Pearson, supra note
116.
120. Jordan v. Bogner, 844 P.2d 664, 666 (Colo. 1993); see also Gerald L.
Michaud & Mark B. Hutton, Medical Tort Law: The Emergence of a Specialty Standard of
Care, 16 TULSA L.J. 720, 730 (1981); Waltz, supra note 118, at 418.
121. See Jordan, 844 P.2d at 666.
122. See STUART M. SPEISER El AL., 4 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 15:19 (March
2018 Update) (surveying varying application of locality rule to non-specialist doctors). But
see Waltz, supra note 118, at 420 (concluding that there will soon be a national standard for
general practitioners, albeit one lower than for specialists).
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negligence.' The rule has been strongly criticized for deterring medical
innovation. " If the standard of care is defined by custom, then any physician who
innovates takes on the risk of deviating from custom. If the innovative practice or
device causes harm, that creates an exposure to malpractice liability for
"unreasonable" behavior even if, on average, the innovation is beneficial. 25
In part due to such criticism, and perhaps also due to the erosion of the
view that physicians should be above criticism,'26 the privileged position of
physicians that allowed them to plead custom in malpractice cases has greatly
diminished:
Gradually, quietly and relentlessly, state courts are withdrawing this
legal privilege. Already, a dozen states have expressly rejected
deference to medical customs and another nine, although not
directly addressing the role of custom, have rephrased their standard
of care in terms of the reasonable physician, rather than compliance
with medical custom.
Even more important than the raw numbers is the trend
revealed by the decisions. The slow but steady judicial abandonment
of deference to medical custom began in earnest in the 1970s,
continued in the 1980s, and retained its vitality through the 1990s.
Showing no signs of exhaustion, this movement could eventually
become the majority position.
Furthermore, many of the states that theoretically continue
to defer to custom actually apply the custom-based standard of care
in a way that operates very much like a reasonable physician
standard.1
2 7
In other words, in more and more states,'28 the physician's duty under
malpractice is being normalized and brought into alignment with the ordinary tort
duty of care, permitting courts to hold that even widespread medical practices can
123. How and why that came to be is itself controversial. See Silver, supra note
113 (arguing that the move away from ordinary negligence rules for the medical profession
was a mistake).
124. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation,
107 MICH. L. REv. 285 (2008).
125. See id.
126. Public deference to the judgment of medical professionals has gradually
declined since World War 11. See generally Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of
Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 163
(2000).
127. Id. at 164; see also Behrens, Note, supra note 119, at 770-72 (concluding
"[t]he movement of nearly all jurisdictions has been to incorporate a national standard of
care, and those that have not had the right case arise have continued to loosely apply the
similar locality rule").
128. By 2009, "almost half of the states [had] adopted an objective 'reasonable
care' standard" instead of one "based on what the majority of medical practitioners actually
do." Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive
Standard of Care, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 423, 428-29 (2009).
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be negligent 129-particularly if the innovations that the physician has not adopted
are "precautions so imperative that even ... universal disregard will not excuse
their omission."'130 Indeed, as a general matter, the standard of care is not only
national but also subject to reasonably rapid change when confronted with a
breakthrough technology. 13' Thus, for example, courts routinely required doctors
to use x-rays to diagnose fractures "very quickly after the technology was
introduced."'132 It was not long until the failure to take a diagnostic x-ray was "so
clearly negligent as to constitute res ipsa loquitur ... an obvious failure to follow
accepted medical practice."'
1 33
129. Peters, supra note 126, at section II.B. (citing cases). Interestingly, studies
show that as states switch from a custom-based measure of the standard of care to a national
standard based on reasonableness, the rate of adoption of innovations converged to the
national mean. This suggests that " his change in behavior was motivated by the change in
tort law's test of reasonable care, not by any independent medical evaluation of whether
compliance with the local or national custom was in the best interests of the patient." Mark
Geistfeld, Does Tort Law Stifle Innovative Medical Treatments?, JOTWELL (June 2, 2015)
(reviewing Anna B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36
CARDOZO L. REv. 913 (2015)), http://torts.jotwell.com/does-tort-law-stifle-innovative-
medical-treatments/).
130. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.).
131. See Patricia Kuszler, Telemedicine and Integrated Health Care Delivery:
Compounding Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 297, 316-17 (1999). On the
physician's duty to keep informed of new treatment methods, see Jolene S. Fernandes,
Perfecting Pregnancy via Preimplantation Genetic Screening: The Quest for an Elusive
Standard of Care, 4 U.C IRVINE L. REv. 1295, 1308-12 (2014); Alan Weintraub,
Physician's Duty to Stay Abreast of Current Medical Developments, 31 MED. TRIAL TECH.
Q. 329 (1985); Carter L. Williams, Note, Evidence-Based Medicine in the Law Beyond
Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 479, 508-12 (2004). Consider also Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (holding that physician's failure to conduct literature search on
side effects of Dilantin justified liability for wrongful birth).
It should also be noted that some advances in the standard of care are not due
to the workings of the tort system and instead arise from statute or regulation. For example,
mass screening for Phenylketonuria (PKU) quickly became a national standard after Robert
Guthrie discovered a cheap and easy PKU test that could reliably identify asymptomatic
infants-this being the time when the potential for treatment is greatest. Mass screening
soon followed, but mostly due to government prodding via state laws requiring testing. See
Dianne B. Paul, The History of Newborn Phenylketonuria Screening in the U.S., in
PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES at app. 5 (Neil A.
Holtzman & Michael S. Watson eds., 1997),
https:/Ibiotech.law.lsu.edu/research/fed/tfgt/appendix5 .htm.
132. William J. Curran, The Unwanted Suitor: Law and the Use of Health Care
Technology, in THE MACHINE AT THE BEDSIDE: STRATEGIES FOR USING TECHNOLOGY IN
PATIENT CARE 119, 123 (Stanley Joel Reiser & Michael Anabar eds., 1984).
133. Id. As early as 1928, the court in Lippold v. Kidd, 269 P. 210, 213 (Or.
1928), accepted that failure to take an x-ray of an injured eye could establish a prima facie
case for medical negligence. This was a sea change, as less than 20 years earlier a
Washington court had held that, in light of testimony that x-rays were used only "as a matter
of extreme care," failure to use an x-ray could not be grounds for a directed verdict. Wells
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More recently, the automated external defibrillator became the standard
of care for first responders in 1988 when the Advanced Cardiac Life Support
(ACLS), a working group of the American Heart Association, endorsed it.'34 The
first articles about clinical use of those defibrillators had appeared in medical
journals only a decade earlier, but the national consensus crystalized quickly after
studies published in the late 1980s demonstrated their value in improving patient
survival. 135
Indeed, some doctors have criticized the legal system for anointing some
technologies as the standard of care too quickly-before the proof is in that they
are helpful-and sticking to that judgment even after studies suggest the
technology does not live up to its promise. For example, initial studies suggested
that Electronic Fetal Monitoring, now used in the large majority of births in the
United States, would lead to a 50% reduction in intrapartum deaths, mental
retardation, and cerebral palsy.136 Later studies undermined those optimistic
predictions, but the malpractice verdicts continued. 1
3 7
Even custom, when it reigned, did not always prove an iron-clad defense.
In 1974, when medical custom was still king, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that even though the national standard of care of ophthalmologists did not
require routine glaucoma tests, in light of the low cost of the test,
reasonable prudence required the timely giving of the pressure test
to this plaintiff. The precaution of giving this test to detect the
incidence of glaucoma to patients under 40 years of age is so
imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the standards of the
opthalmology [sic] profession, it is the duty of the courts to say
what is required to protect patients under 40 from the damaging
results of glaucoma.
138
Although the decision was much criticized at the time, and "no other courts ...
followed the Helling case directly,"'139 it was a harbinger of things to come.
v. Ferry-Baker Lumber Co., 107 P. 869, 870 (Wash. 1910). By 1961, the requirement of x-
rays in cases of injury was clearly established. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Peterson, 359 P.2d
307, 310 (Wash. 1961).
134. See Richard 0. Cummins, From Concept o Standard-of-Care? Review of the
Clinical Experience with Automated External Defibrillators, 18 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.
1269, 1270 (1989), doi: 10.1016/SO196-0644(89)80257-4.
135. See id. at 1269-70.
136. "EFM is used in approximately 85% of annual births and is the most
common obstetrical procedure in the United States during labor." Michael Brook & Kary
Irle, Litigating Intraoperative Neuromonitoring (Iom), 45 U. BALT. L. REv. 443, 465 (2016).
137. Id.; see also Margaret Lent, The Medical and Legal Risks of the Electronic
Fetal Monitor, 51 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1999) (arguing that auscultation should replace EFM
as standard of care); Thomas P. Sartwelle, Electronic Fetal Monitoring: A Bridge Too Far,
33 J. LEGAL MED. 313 (2012), doi: 10.1080/01947648.2012.714321 (blaming greedy trial
lawyers and "junk science" for rise and persistence of EFM as standard of care).
138. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (citing T.J. Hooper, 60
F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932)).
139. Curran, supra note 132, at 125.
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As we have seen with the x-ray and the automated external defibrillator,
the standard of care indeed can change quickly. The rise of evidence-based
medicine (EBM), which encourages physicians to apply current scientific evidence
even before it becomes a custom,40 arguably encourages this trend. If EBM
becomes the meta-standard, then physicians may become liable for not considering
the latest evidence, potentially causing fast tracking of malpractice liability. 141
D. Nature of Machine Learning Removes Common Obstacles to the Adoption of
New Medical Technology
Much of the writing and thinking about the interaction between medical
negligence rules and technical change concerns clinical techniques or devices that
are not unambiguously good for the patients to whom the new technology may be
applied. Most of these technologies create new risks as well as benefits;
142
frequently they require new training without which physicians may fear they could
fail to reap the benefits of the new technology or even misuse it in a harmful
way.143 Frequently there is concern that not all the long-term risks of the new
techniques or devices will necessarily be evident at the time that the physician
must decide whether to use the familiar procedure or the new one. '" Each of these
properties creates the specter of tort liability if something goes wrong, creating
disincentives that may balance out or even overcome the purported advantages: a
bad outcome following a new surgical procedure creates the risk that the patient
may claim improper training; a new implantable device creates risks of unforeseen
long-term complications or even failure; a new invasive diagnostic procedure may
have side effects; some advanced diagnostic equipment may be too expensive to
have in every hospital, much less in every physician's office.
ML systems are different from these common examples in many
important respects. From the point of view of malpractice risk management, Al
diagnostics should be much easier to implement than other recent medical
advances that have required expensive equipment be present on-site. ML can be
trained to work with any diagnostic materials that can be reduced to standardized
data, notably including radiographic images. As the ML is fundamentally a
computer program, the analysis need not be done on-site but can instead live
anywhere else or even in the cloud.14' Any medical facility capable of capturing
140. Proponents define EBM as "the integration of best research evidence with
our clinical expertise and our patient's unique values and circumstances." See SHARON E.
STRAUS ET AL., EVIDENCE BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH IT 1 (2011).
141. See E Monico, C Moore & A Calise, The Impact of Evidence-Based
Medicine and Evolving Technology on the Standard of Care in Emergency Medicine, 3:2
INTERNET J. OF L, HEALTHCARE AND ETHICS 1 (2004).
142. See Greenberg, supra note 128, at 436.
143. See id. at 435-36.
144. See id. at 430, 445-46.
145. Any remote location and especially cloud-based services raise issues of
security and privacy outside the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Sebastian Zimmeck, The
Information Privacy Law of Web Applications and Cloud Computing, 29 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451, 469-82 (2013) (surveying risks of information
disclosure); Warwick Ashford, Cloud Computing Presents a Top Security Challenge,
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clinical information, digitizing it, and transmitting it, could presumably access an
ML-based computer located anywhere else, so long as the cost was affordable.
In short, the data collection needs to be done at the point of care, where
the patient is-the data input and the processing can be done anywhere. Rather
than being equipment or a technique, ML systems present as a service. Unless the
pricing is extortionate, this will not only increase the rate at which medical service
providers adopt ML systems, but also increase the speed with which hospitals, and
even local physicians, feel legal pressure to use ML. 146
However, there is one way in which ML may not be different from other
medical innovations: it will not be immune to all malpractice claims. Even if we
can prove that an ML system, on average, is a better diagnostician than the average
physician, that will not mean it is incapable of actionable error. For example, a
patient misdiagnosed by an ML might claim that, even if the ML's overall average
is better than most or all humans, a significant part of the ML's success occurs in
cases where humans would have failed, and that a significant part of the ML's
errors fall on a group of patients who might have fared better with a human
doctor.147 The misdiagnosed patient could claim that he or she fell into the group
who would have fared better with an average-or a particular-human physician.
Simply put, humans and ML systems might make very different kinds of mistakes.
And these differences might affect the manner in which liability is assessed.
Currently, we tend to train ML systems from databases that reflect the
best judgments of panels of practicing physicians. 148 One could, in theory, train on
actual real-world outcomes if the medical system commonly annotated diagnostic
data files with outcome data at regular intervals. At present, however, it is not
common to find, say, a database containing radiological images linked with data
about whether and which tumors manifested in the patients over a set period of
time. Given the hypothesis on which this Article is based-that an ML system has
managed to do substantially better on average than do human physicians-we
COMPUTERWEEKLY (Dec. 10, 2008, 4:43 PM), http://
www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2008/12/10/233839/cloud-computing-presents-a-top-
security-challenge.htm; J. Aikat et al., Rethinking Security in the Era of Cloud Computing,
IEEE SECURITY PRIVACY, May-June 2017, at § 3.1, doi: 10.1109/MSP.2017.80
(summarizing top cloud-security threat types).
146. Watson as a service also raises some complex issues of what standards of
liability would apply to Watson's errors. See Jessica S. Allain, Comment, From Jeopardy!
to Jaundice: The Medical Liability Implications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial
Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. L. REV. 1049 (2013). It also raises potentially difficult
problems of proof, as one would need a perfect snapshot of the entire medical database on
which the ML could have relied at the moment of treatment to prove that had the ML been
consulted it would have made a better decision than the human. Unfortunately, these issues
are beyond the scope of this Article.
147. See Millar & Kerr, supra note 11.
148. See Fei Jiang, Yong Jian, Hui Zhi, Yi Dong, Hao Li, Sufeng Ma, Yilong
Wang, Qiang Dong, Haipeng Shen & Yongjun Wang, Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare:
Past, Present and Future, 2 STROKE & VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230 (2017),
doi: 10.1136/svn-2017-000101.
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would not expect in the short term149 that the ML system's errors would tend to be
in cases that humans would, on average, have diagnosed correctly. Nevertheless,
because that tendency is only a matter of probability, the possibility cannot be
excluded as a provable or mathematical certainty in general or indeed in any given
case. Worse, as described in Subsection I.A. 1, the current state of the art for neural
networks, with its lack of interpretability, creates some circumstances in which
there is no practical way for humans to examine the reasoning for any given
decision.15 Furthermore, the lack of causal connections of the sort humans
typically use to understand reasoning makes it difficult to pinpoint a specific
source of error in the ML-based prediction system. Any given diagnosis is the
result of correlations based on the entire medical database available at the moment
of diagnosis. As a result, given current technology,'5' a physician or hospital
relying on a neural network cannot back up any particular decision with evidence
of a reasoned decision-making process beyond pointing to the program's overall
batting average and perhaps (if the system is programmed to provide it) to an
evidence profile that shows how it weighed different classes of information'52 or
perhaps to some number indicating the neural network's degree of confidence in
its diagnosis.'53 Thus, for example, if a hospital is relying on ML for its diagnosis,
both parties in a resulting malpractice action will be free to provide ex post
rationalizations based on expert testimony by humans, but while defendants
relying on the ML system will have a chance to argue that the ML system made
the right call on the merits, the defendants may have the disadvantage of not being
able to explain how the actual decision came to be.
A neural network can learn from its successes and its mistakes-that is
the key to how it is trained initially. So long as its decisions are being reviewed by
human physicians on an ongoing basis we would hope that its success rate
continues to improve as its training data incorporates new information based on the
physicians' input.5 4 Likewise, such systems will improve as the quality and
quantity of data increases.155 Most commonly this would happen in batch mode,
not real time: scientists train models first and deploy them into the wild in a static
form. 156 They might then release updated versions later that take into account new
149. We return to the issue of relative long-term accuracy in Part III.
150. See supra text accompanying note 74.
151. For a discussion of ongoing efforts to provide explanation see infra text
accompanying notes 324-28.
152. For an example of this in the Jeopardy game-show context, see David
Ferrucci et al, Building Watson: An Overview of the DeepQA Project, Al MAG., Fall 2010,
http://www.aaai.org/Magazine/Watson/watson.php, in which weights are given to
"location," "passage support," "popularity," "source reliability," and "taxonomic"
categories for the answer to the question "Chile shares its longest land border with this
country."
153. See G. Papadopoulos, P.J. Edwards & A.F. Murray, Confidence Estimation
Methods for Neural Networks: A Practical Comparison, 12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
NEURAL NETWORKS 1278 (2001), doi: 10.1109/72.963764.
154. But see supra text accompanying note 70.
155. See Jay, supra note 62.
156. See id.
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data. Working in batch mode allows for testing between releases and makes it
easier to avoid error that can occur if the neural network is learning in real time. 157
Furthermore, we would expect that, prior to the adoption of ML diagnosticians,
researchers would have studied ML's outcomes carefully to see if any patterns of
error emerge. Perhaps doctors using ML diagnoses could be warned not to rely on
them for any identifiable sub-classes of cases where humans were still superior.
However, it is worth noting that the search for such patterns of error likely would
require a careful review process external to the ML system because the ML itself is
unlikely to be able to make these distinctions unless the sub-classes to consider can
be defined for it in advance. Worse, while doctors should be able to identify some
false positives (Type I errors) fairly quickly-e.g., if they operate but find no
tumor'58-false negatives (Type II errors) may take longer to manifest; this may
pose real risk to patients if they are misdiagnosed as a result of reliance on the ML
system because arly detection and intervention are the key to cancer survival
rates.159 Ideally, rigorous external review would keep the number of meritorious
malpractice claims based on a robust ML system's diagnoses low and should keep
the number of successful claims low as well, but the technical obstacles to
achieving this ideal may be substantial.
E. Malpractice Law Will Require Machine Learning Systems When They Are
Demonstrably Better
It is important to recall two basic rules of malpractice law: bad outcomes
do not necessarily mean there was malpractice, and physicians are not expected to
be perfect.16 Sadly, there are some cases that cannot be cured with even the best
medical care in the world. A physician (or hospital, or insurer) relying on an ML
system will be held to no different a standard than if the physician relied on a
human; indeed, from a legal point of view, the decision to rely on ML will be a
human medical judgment like any other. As noted above, the law requires only that
physicians exhibit the ordinary skill and judgment of a reasonably competent,
similarly situated physician.16' Thus, a physician, hospital, or insurer relying on an
ML diagnosis will, at least initially, be held to no higher standard than that of the
ordinary physician. Once ML itself becomes the standard of care, ML will raise
157. For an example of the dangers of continual real-time learning, see James
Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft's Al Chatbot to be a Racist Asshole in Less than a Day,
THE VERGE (Mar 24, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-
chatbot-racist.
158. However, it should be noted that some oncological treatment regimens do
not involve initial surgery, for example those relying instead on chemotherapy. Error may
be harder to detect in such cases since the absence of a subsequent cancer might falsely be
attributed to successful treatment.
159. See Early Detection Facts and Figures, CANARY FOUND.,
http://www.canaryfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/EarlyDetectionFactSheet.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2019).
160. "In most situations the best medical treatment in the world cannot provide an
absolute guarantee of success; medicine is not an exact science in that sense." McBride v.
United States, 462 F.2d 72, 75 (9th Cir. 1972).
161. See supra Subsection I.C.1.
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the bar. But even though a higher level of accuracy will now be the standard, the
malpractice exposure of ML-users will actually shrink because by relying on ML
they will be complying with the professional standard; 162 at that point, reliance on
human diagnosticians will become the risky legal strategy both for failing to use an
increasingly common technology of which they should have been aware and
because (by hypothesis) the risk of error is in fact greater.
In states that have changed the standard of care to align with general tort
principles, one would expect he legal pressure to adopt ML to be very strong once
the evidence was clear that an ML system was better than human physicians, for it
would be unreasonable to fail to adopt ML unless the cost was very high.163 In the
decreasing number of states that still allow custom to act as a defense, medical
malpractice law's definition of the standard of care can act as a brake on
innovation. In those states, the legal push to use ML will not be as great until ML
is in common use nationally in the relevant specialty; at that point, ML usage itself
becomes customary, and we would expect the law to provide a strong push toward
compliance with the relevant general norm for any late adopters.' 64
There are more than 15,000 medical malpractice claims filed against
healthcare providers in the United States every year.165 Although a 2015 report by
the National Academy of Sciences called diagnostic error the "blind spot" in
modern medicine,166 diagnostic error is increasingly recognized as a major
162. One small caveat ought to be noted here: were an ML system to provide a
clearly ludicrous diagnosis, one that any reasonable physician ought to have noticed was
wrong or inapposite, then-even after it becomes the standard of care-relying on ML in
those circumstances could easily be characterized as negligence, and plausibly as gross
negligence. This entails a need for continued comprehensive human training, even if the
role of human physicians, like pilots, becomes secondary to the role played by machines.
See, e.g., Madeline Elish & Tim Hwang, Praise the Machine! Punish the Human!: The
Contradictory History of Accountability in Automated Aviation, DATA & SOCIETY
(Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.datasociety.net/pubs/ia/Elish-Hwang-Accountability
AutomatedAviation.pdf.
163. We address this issue in Part II below.
164. There is one persistent exception to this trend: the "two schools of thought"
doctrine. Under this doctrine doctors have a powerful defense against a malpractice claim
based on failure to adhere to the standard of care if the defendant can show that the
treatment provided is supported by a minority of professionals in the field due to
disagreement as to which is the optimal treatment. See generally Douglas Brown, Panacea
or Pandora' Box: The Two Schools of Medical Thought Doctrine after Jones v. Chidester,
44 J. URBAN & CONTEMP. LAW 223 (1993). Note that this defense would not generally apply
if the minority consisted of doctors unwilling to modernize in the face of a demonstrably
better new technique or technology. Use of the defense would be limited to situations where
evidence as to which "school" is better is disputed in the medical literature or among
experts.
165. Most Common Causes of Medical Malpractice Claims, OHIO TIGER,
https://ohiotiger.com/common-causes-medical-malpractice-claims/ (last updated April 15,
2016).
166. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, IMPROVING DIAGNOSIS IN HEALTH CARE 1
(Erin P. Balogh, Bryan T. Miller & John R. Ball eds., 2015).
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problem: estimates of the prevalence of diagnostic error range from 5% to 20% of
physician-patient encounters;167 "cognitive factors," particularly "premature
closure" (being satisfied with an initial conclusion) are a major cause, perhaps
even the primary cause, of these errors.168 Doctors, hospitals, insurers, and any
other participants in the healthcare system with exposure to malpractice liability
should be particularly attracted to any new technology that promises a substantial
reduction in diagnostic error, a major source of malpractice claims. 169
From the point of view of the tort-law theorist, at least of the law-and-
economics persuasion, the idea that fear of malpractice liability would push
medical care providers toward using a technology with a lower error rate is a
happy story as tort law seems poised to do exactly what theorists would want it to
do: it incentivizes a profession to adopt a new technology that likely will save
lives. 70 Indeed, even if tort law was neutral or a possible brake, as in the case of
custom-dependent states before the national trend develops,'7 ' once ML's success
rate is demonstrably superior to human physicians we would expect that both
medical ethics and cost considerations would drive medical care providers to
choose to consult an ML system and to rely on its judgments unless they could
articulate good reasons not to. Thus, if ML's track record is significantly better
than most humans', then arguably ethics would counsel (most'72) humans to rely
on the ML even if they believed they had a superior diagnosis. ' In time, perhaps
even in a short time, a provably superior ML becomes the standard of care for
diagnosis in a specialty in many jurisdictions, and certainly throughout he United
States.
We turn now to the economic drivers toward ML-and to some
speculation about ML's economic consequences. Our happiness may prove
temporary.
167. Paul A. Bergl et al., Diagnostic Error in the Critically III: Defining the
Problem and Exploring Next Steps to Advance Intensive Care Unit Safety, 15 ANNALS OF
THE AM. THORACIC Soc'Y 903, 903 (2018), doi: 10.1513/AnnalsATS.201801-068PS.
168. See Mark L. Graber et al., Diagnostic Error in Internal Medicine, 165
ARCHIVES OF INTERNALMED. 1493, 1493, 1498 (2005), doi: 10.1001/archinte.165.13.1493.
169. Misdiagnosis is the most common cause of malpractice claims in outpatient
settings; surgical errors are the most common cause of malpractice claims in hospital
settings. Most Common Causes of Medical Malpractice, supra note 165.
170. See Gumo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970) ("1 take it as
axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.").
171. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 124, at 303-08.
172. Presumably Dr. House would demur.
173. See Millar & Kerr, supra note 11. The argument in the text presupposes that
the human physician at least accepts that Watson's diagnosis is plausible. If the human
physician believes Watson's diagnosis is erroneous, then he or she will have a duty to step
in. See supra note 162; see also infra text accompanying notes 196-97 (discussing how
errors can happen).
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II. MACHINE LEARNING AND THE DEMAND FOR SPECIALIST
PHYSICIANS
A. Machine Learning and the Market for Diagnostic Physicians
Physicians are expensive to train, and expensive to keep on staff. 174 Given
the necessity of acquiring training data, formatting it, and establishing compatible
data-exchange regimes with hospitals and other medical care providers,'75
we presume that ML diagnostics will follow the path of many other digital
technologies and exhibit high fixed costs but relatively low marginal costs. 176 The
fixed costs will be the presumably high cost of first priming the system with
training data, then arranging for compatible data input from the treating
physician's office. The costs of processing individual requests we presume to be
low by comparison, although this is, at best, only informed speculation on our part.
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) may, however, be instructive: early MRI
machines cost around $2 million plus $1 million for installation.'77 Modern state-
of-the-art devices can cost up to $3 million.178 Yet failure to use one would in
many cases be malpractice. As the high capital cost of an MRI machine can be
shared by the many patients who will use it during the machine's lifetime, the per-
patient cost is low enough to make an MRI the standard of care, and therefore the
standard diagnostic tool, for many different diseases and sets of symptoms. 179
174. In 2017 the median U.S. wage for an internist, one of the lowest-paid
medical specialties, was $198,370, while the median anesthesiologist received $265,990.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Physicians and Surgeons,
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/print/physicians-and-surgeons.htm (last modified June
11, 2018). In 2015, the median salary for a radiologist was about $400,000. R. C. Semelka
et al., Radiologist Income, Receipts, and Academic Performance: An Analysis of Many
Nations, 57 ACTA RADIOLOGICA 1497, 1500 (2016), doi: 10.1177/0284185116633914.
Doctors also impose substantial overheads, plus require offices and support staff.
175. For more on the importance of acquiring training data, see infra text
accompanying notes 308-13.
176. A typical example is an online multiplayer game, or any other service subject
to a network effect. These typically involve a fixed setup cost, but the marginal cost of
adding additional users is relatively low. See, e.g., Pachinco, MMORPG's and How They
Turn a Profit, Post on Gaming Discussions Forum, NEoGAF (Nov. 12, 2008),
https://www.neogaf.com/threads/mmorpgs-and-how-they-turn-a-profit.341822/ (discussing
fixed and variable costs of World of Warcraft). The extreme example is digital publishing,
for "[o]nce a work is created, the marginal cost of making an unlimited number of digital
copies and distributing them worldwide is zero." Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative
Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U.
CHI. L. REv. 263, 300 (2002). We assume that because an ML system is fundamentally
(expensive) software it tends toward the software-publishing side of the spectrum.
177. Ben L. Holmes, Current Strategies for the Development of Medical Devices
in TECHNOLOGY AND HEALTH CARE IN AN ERA OF LIMITS 219, 220 (INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
STAFF 1992).
178. Lacie Glover, Why Your MRI or CT Scan Costs an Arm and a Leg, FISCAL
TIMES (July 21, 2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/07/21/Why-Your-
MRI-or-CT-Scan-Costs-Arm-and-Leg.
179. Klustaitis, supra note 89, at § 111.2.
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At present, the smart bet seems to be that ML systems will not be as
expensive as a human physician: "Once a model has been 'trained,' it can be
deployed on a relatively modest budget."80 In any plausible cost scenario,
however, the medical services provider's financial problem is that unless ML
replaces all or part of some other cost-the human doctor being the natural
target-ML is just one more cost, whether small, medium, or large. And as is well
known, the medical sector is under pressure to cut costs. 18'
Whatever the pricing scenario, the more that an ML system becomes the
diagnostician of choice, the less there should be demand for similar human
diagnosticians.'82 Instead, all that will be necessary is for someone to collect the
patient's data and feed it to the system. Recall our second simplifying assumption
above, that Prediction-ML is replacing a consulting specialist, not the point-of-care
physician.'83 The legal issues created by purely automated medicine of the
Treatment-ML variety are both more remote in time and more complex than those
discussed here.'84 If it becomes the case that all that ML requires is the input of
data, in many cases those data could be collected by less-trained technicians, just
as today nurses or trained medical technicians, not physicians, take blood samples,
Electrocardiograms (EKGs), MRIs, and CT-scans. Or, in time, other specially
trained AIs may do the intake interview as well. 185
If someday we remove human doctors entirely from the treatment
protocol and have patients treated only by machines, the tort-law frame could
change from medical malpractice to products liability. That day, however, is likely
much farther away than the scenario we focus on here: one in which point-of-care
180. Andrew Beam & Isaac S. Kohane, Translating Artificial Intelligence into
Clinical Care, 316 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 2368, 2369 (2016).
181. U.S. health-care spending is projected to outpace growth in the United States'
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by about one percentage point in the coming decade,
leading to estimates that health-care spending may account for 19.7% of GDP by 2026, up
from 17.9% in 2016. Gigi A. Cuckler et al., National Health Expenditure Projections,
2017 26: Despite Uncertainty, Fundamentals Primarily Drive Spending Growth, 37
HEALTH AFFAIRS 482, 482 (2018). "Rising health care costs pose a direct threat to workers'
take-home pay, the federal budget, and state government finances." Cutting Health Care
Costs, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 2, 2012) (quoting Citigroup, Inc Vice President Peter
Orszag, a former director of the Office of Management and Budget),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2012/08/02/11970/cutting-health-
care-costs/.
182. For a general argument that "the number of workers-intellectual as well as
manual-is reduced by quantum measures in computer-mediated labor" see Aronowitz &
DiFazio, supra note 7, at 53.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
184. For a taste of the issues see Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer:
Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2018).
185. For an account of an early attempt to train an Al to do patient interviews in
China see Baidu Announces Melody, a New AI-Powered Conversational Bot for Doctors
and Patients, MKT. WIRED (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.marketwired.com/press-
release/baidu-announces-melody-a-new-ai-powered-conversationa-bot-for-doctors-and-
patients-nasdaq-bidu-2165197.htm.
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doctors use an Al first as a decision-support tool and then as a substitute for
consulting experts in back-office specialties, such as radiology or pathology.
Even in our more imminent scenario, patients injured by AIs on which
doctors rely may have product-liability claims against the Al's supplier as well as
malpractice claims against its user. 86 Possible patient claims against the people
responsible for providing the Al raise complicated questions including whether
one would characterize what was provided as a good or a service,'87 and whether a
buggy Al would be characterized as suffering from a product defect or a design
defect.'88 That characterization could have legal consequences because product-
defect claims tend to be strict liability,' 89 while the nature and evidentiary
requirements of design defect claims are currently contested terrain.90 Although
historically U.S. courts have been reluctant to allow strict-liability claims against
doctors using medical technology,'9' the specter of product-liability claims should
incentivize Al suppliers to take care to provide high-quality diagnostic services
because they will wish to avoid lengthy or expensive lawsuits. At the same time, it
is important to acknowledge the plausible counterargument hat a characterization
of ML-gone-wrong as any kind of defect could be misguided because ML is
premised on the idea that the software will transcend its initial programming. 192
When an ML learns to make decisions that are unpredictable or unintended, it may
not be because anything has gone wrong or because the product (or service) is
defective in its performance or design.19' Emergent behavior is often the very
reason to deploy an ML; its departure from human decision-making is often a
feature, not a bug.'
94
Either way, medical service providers and insurers will, at first, treat ML
diagnosis simply as another tool that is available to physicians. Thus at first,
hospitals will feel required to keep the same number of physicians around to
double-check what the ML does. This will be costly because the hospitals and
insurers will have to pay both the physicians and whoever provides the diagnostic
service. In addition, as big-data-based diagnosis takes off, hospitals may be
186. See, e.g., Ian Kerr, Jason Millar & Noel Corriveau, Robots and Artificial
Intelligence in Healthcare, in CANADIAN HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 257 (5th ed. 2017).
187. See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 353, 390 (2016)
(describing this as a "thorny issue").
188. See generally DAVID G. OWENS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (3d ed. 2015).
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Am. Law Inst. 1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1-2 (Am. Law Inst. 1988).
190. For a spirited salvo in this debate, which also describes the issues, see
generally George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Product Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087 (2000).
191. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, When the "Machine That Goes 'Ping"' Causes
Harm: Default Torts Rules and Technologically-Mediated Health Care Injuries, 46 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 37, 53-58 (2002).
192. See generally Kerr, Millar & Corriveau, supra note 186.
193. See generally Millar & Kerr, supra note 11.
194. See id.
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expected to collect increasing amounts of data to supply the Al with the
information it needs to continue to learn to improve its diagnoses.'95 Thus,
hospitals will find themselves paying for more recording equipment, for more
nurses and technicians to apply the recording equipment, for the same number of
physicians, and for the Al. Again, in the short run, bills go up.
However, once confidence in the Al increases, insurers will inevitably
seek cost savings by decreasing the use of physicians to do diagnosis. These
savings are likely to be small in comparison to what might be achieved from
having machines do treatment as well as diagnosis, but one could see these small
savings as the vanguard of a possible future in which the push to replace doctors
with machines is more widespread. We suspect that the real action will occur once
ML capably encroaches on areas of medical treatment-including not only the
development of treatment plans but also their delivery.
Initially, rather than remove humans entirely from the diagnostic loop,
hospitals and insurers likely will seek to have a physician review ML diagnoses.
Because the cost savings are predicated on reducing the number of physicians, the
inevitable result of this "human in the loop" policy is that each remaining
physician will be tasked with reviewing a larger number of cases per day than they
previously handled. At some point, perhaps quite soon, the load on the physicians
will rise to the point where one might question their ability to do more than a basic
reality check.196 Even that check undoubtedly will have some value, because at
present MLs can become confused-such as when the Jeopardy-playing Watson
suggested Toronto is a U.S. city.
197
However, we question how often a physician presented with a large
volume of cases would be able to detect relatively subtle errors. As the load
195. How this plays out will depend on the regulatory and competitive
environment. Data collection might be mandated, or it might be the subject of negotiation
between at least the Al vendor(s) and the hospitals. Hospitals (or even patients?) might, for
example, expect to be paid for their valuable data.
196. Cf. Juan Mateos-Garcia, To Err Is Algorithm: Algorithmic Fallibility and
Economic Organisation, NESTA (May 10, 2017), http://www.nesta.org.ukfblog/err-
algorithm-algorithmic-fallibility-and-economic-organisation. Mateos-Garcia argues that
supervisors need to check each decision individually. This means that as
the number of decisions increases, most of the organisation's labour bill
will be spent on supervision, with potentially spiralling costs as the
supervision process gets bigger and more complicated ..... When
considered together, the decline in algorithmic accuracy and the
increase in labour costs ... are likely to limit the number of algorithmic
decisions an organisation can make economically.
Id.
197. Despite surface appearances, it is not. For an explanation of the error, see
Steve Hamm, Watson on Jeopardy! Day Two: The Confusion over an Airport Clue,
SMARTER PLANET BLOG (Feb. 15, 2011), http://asmarterplanet.com/blog/2011/02/watson-
on-jeopardy-day-two-the-confusion-over-an-airport-clue.html. For other ntertaining
examples of ML errors, see Janelle Shane, When Algorithms Surprise Us, AIWEIRDNESS.COM
(Apr. 13, 2018), http://aiweirdness.com/post/172894792687/when-algorithms-surprise-us.
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increases, the carefulness of the review must inevitably decrease; meanwhile, it
seems probable that the human's malpractice liability would remain the same,
making the physician a moral and possibly financial "crumple zone."'
98
Ultimately, either the physicians will rebel, or the cost of their insurance will wipe
out at least a chunk of the savings, or MLs will become so reliable that insurance
companies and hospitals force physicians out of the loop. In this scenario, bills go
down unless ML providers react o the removal of the human doctors by charging
even higher monopoly prices-something that presumably would be prohibited by
the Sherman Act. 199
Indeed, the removal of humans from the practice of radiology has already
begun. Krista Jones wrote of her son's decision to become a radiology technician:
After seeing what this radiation treatment was able to do for me, my
son applied to a university program in radiology technology to
explore a career path in medical radiation. He met countless
radiology technicians throughout my years of treatment and was
excited to start his training off in a specialized program. However,
during his application process, the program was cancelled: He was
told it was because there were no longer enough jobs in the
radiology industry to warrant the program's continuation. 200
Whatever the current demand for radiologists, future doctors, and even
radiology technicians, they are being exposed to strong signals that radiology is a
field with no future: "They should stop training radiologists now," asserts
University of Toronto Professor Geoffrey Hinton.20 1 Hinton's view is extreme:
radiologists do more than view films; for example, interventional radiologists
oversee radiation and other treatment for patients.20 2 Nevertheless, Hinton's
198. See Madeline Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human
Robot Interaction (Columbia Univ. & Data Soc'y, We Robot 2016 Working Paper),
http://robots.law.miami.edu/2016/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ELISHWEROBOT_
cautionary-tales_03212016.pdf. ML can be used to choose which cases are most uncertain
and present those only to reduce the volume. But there remains the risk that the ML system
gets it wrong, i.e., misses some important cases that need to be reviewed, and we are back to
the problem of humans having too many cases to review.
199. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (making it a felony to
,monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations").
200. Krista Jones, I Was Worried About Artificial Intelligence-Until It Saved My
Life, QUARTZ (Aug. 20, 2017), https://qz.com/1056817/i-was-worried-about-artificial-
intelligence-until-it-saved-my-life/.
201. Quoted in Mukherjee, supra note 26.
202. See supra note 27; see also David Kessel, What is Interventional Radiology?,
BRITISH SOCIETY OF INTERVENTIONAL RADIOLOGY, https://www.bsir.org/patients/what-is-
interventional-radiology/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2019).
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overstatement represents the perceptual zeitgeist of many incoming students, who
will increasingly turn their focus toward other specialties.203
That said, the future in which a patient in the United States consults an Al
directly for treatment without seeing even a primary care physician seems highly
implausible if not far, far away-not only from a scientific point of view but also
from a legal perspective. Direct-to-patient services of this type face legal and
regulatory obstacles of their own, not the least of which is unauthorized-practice-
of-medicine claims in many states.2 4 Doctorless diagnosis, on the other hand, may
not be so far away. In 2015, the Federal Trade Commission settled claims against
marketers of "MelApp" and "Mole Detective" for "deceptively claiming their
mobile apps could detect symptoms of melanoma, even in its early stages.' 20 5 But
only three years later, the FDA approved an Al-based program that can detect
diabetic retinopathy.20 6 Although the system is marketed to health-care
professionals, it requires no input from a trained doctor,207 so it seems fair to
speculate that at-home use may not be so far away. Meanwhile, HealthTap's "Dr.
Al" offers online services and mobile-phone apps that use an algorithm to respond
203. See Bo Gong, et al., Influence of Artificial Intelligence on Canadian Medical
Students' Preference for Radiology Specialty: A National Survey Study, ACAD. RADIOLOGY
(forthcoming 2019), https://www.academicradiology.org/article/S1076-6332(18)30471-
9/pdf, doi: 10.1016/j.acra.2018.10.007 (reporting that survey of students at 17 Canadian
medical schools showed fear of displacement by Al "discouraged many medical students
from considering the radiology specialty" and suggesting that " [t] he radiology community
should educate medical students about the potential impact of Al, to ensure radiology is
perceived as a viable long-term career choice"). But see Kush Purohit, Growing
Interest in Radiology Despite Al Fears, ACAD.
RADIOLOGY (forthcoming 2019), https ://www. sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S1076633219300406, doi: 10.1016/j.acra.2018.11.024 (noting that 2017-2018 U.S.
National Residency Match Program saw highest percentage of applicants to diagnostic
radiology programs since 2010).
204. However, they might have promise for countries with less-developed
economies or large, dispersed, rural populations. See, e.g., Your Face Could Reveal if You
Have a Rare Disease, WIRED UK, http://www.wired.co.uk/article/fdna-rare-disease-facial-
recognition-algorithms (last visited Jun 11, 2017) (describing use of phones to detect rare
diseases).
205. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC CRACKS DowN ON MARKETERS OF
"MELANOMA DETECTION" APPS, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/02/ftc-cracks-down-marketers-melanoma-detection-apps (last visited
Sep 30, 2017).
206. See FDA, supra note 43.
207. The IDx-DR analyzes "images of the eye taken with a retinal camera called
the Topcon NW400." Id. According to its manufacturer, the Topcon NW400 "can be
operated by someone who isn't a physician and it only takes nomnedical personnel a few
hours to learn to take a picture." See Marcia Frellick, Al Speeds Diabetic Retinopathy
Diagnosis Without Specialist, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/901297#vp_2. Indeed, the manufacturer of the
camera provides online education for technicians wishing to learn to operate it. See Online
Diagnostic Instrument Training, EYE ON EDUCATION, https://eye.opted.org/1988 (last visited
Jan. 6, 2019).
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to medical queries by steering users to a library of informative articles or to a
physician who can answer by text or video chat-or ultimately make a referral to a
doctor or to the emergency room.
208
B. Machine Learning and the Deskilling Debate
Medical observers have repeatedly warned that new technology causes
the loss of old skills. 209 It is too early to say whether ML will cause the loss of
diagnostic skills 210 and "reduced interest in and decreased ability to perform
holistic evaluations of patients, with loss of valuable and irreducible aspects of the
human experience such as psychological, relational, social, and organizational
issues"211 or whether we should better "hypothesize that the use of [IL],
especially their ability to identify and rank differential diagnoses, might actually
improve diagnostic acumen.' 212 We may never know; if ML actually eliminates all
or most of the demand for the diagnostic services of physicians in a given
specialty, inevitably there will be some kind of loss of human know-how, however
one characterizes it. The reduction in demand for physicians in a specialty will
have knock-on effects in medical schools, as students, and especially interns and
residents, steer away from the subject. Soon, hiring committees will decide to use
scarce resources elsewhere. The knowledge is not lost-it lives on in the few
remaining specialists and researchers and in a database-but it is no longer being
added to in the same manner because humans contribute few, if any, new
diagnoses paired with outcomes to the ML system's database. Instead, new data
about outcomes come primarily from situations where ML itself provided the
diagnosis. One can only speculate about the extent to which the future of human
medical knowledge will be compromised after a generation or two of diagnostic or
treatment decisions generated exclusively by machines.
ML may also have other deskilling effects beyond the elimination of a
specialty. We will still need physicians to act upon ML's conclusions and to do the
surgery-at least until we have good robot surgeons, which seems to involve a
much more complex set of challenges.213 On the other hand, we may not need
physicians to interview the patient. An ML system could do the job, or perhaps-
initially-a nurse practitioner (or even a nurse) might do the interview, if guided
208. See What We Make, HEALTHTAP,
https://www.healthtap.com/what we make/story (last visited Jan. 6, 2019).
209. See Robert Lehr Goodman, Commentary: Health Care Technology and
Medical Education: Putting Physical Diagnosis in Its Proper Place, 85 ACAD. MEDICINE
945, 946 (2010), doi: 10.1097/ACM.0b0l3e3l8ldbb55b (lamenting that "the exam skills of
even today's most seasoned examiner pale in comparison with those of earlier eras"); see
also GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 56 (noting that "[e]very generation enjoys the services of
at least a few pessimists who despair of the current state of affairs" in medicine).
210. For a warning, see Federico Cabitza et al., Unintended Consequences of
Machine Learning in Medicine, 318 JAMA 517, 517 (2017), doi: 10.1001/jama.2017.7797
("A major issue related to incorporation of ML-DSS in medicine could be overreliance on
the capabilities of automation.").
211. Id.
212. GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 58.
213. See, e.g., Kerr, Millar & Corriveau, supra note 186, at 257.
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by questionnaires, updated on the fly, provided by an expert system; tomorrow the
questionnaire may be informed by a full Al interacting with information from real-
time sensors.214 The more that Al medicine provides occasions for substituting less
expensive personnel for physicians and other highly paid medical service
providers,215 the more we can expect simple economic pressure to push toward the
same ends we ascribed to malpractice liability above. A further push likely will
come from the need to force the data collected to be as standardized as possible, in
order to become quality fodder for future Al training and testing.
Anticipating some version of this future, an opinion column in the
Journal of the American Medical Association recently suggested that in order to
maintain their relevance, perhaps radiologists and pathologists should rebrand
themselves as "Information Specialists" "whose responsibility will not be so much
to extract information from images and histology but to manage the information
extracted by artificial intelligence in the clinical context of the patient." 2 16 Even so,
the article suggested that there would be enormous economies of scale, allowing
the specialists to export their work: "A single information specialist, with the help
of artificial intelligence, could potentially manage screening for an entire town in
Africa.1217 Indeed, this more or less is the business model of the startup
Alexapath.
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Extrapolating the future of Al-based diagnostic medicine is not easy.
Current trials offer hope that ML systems will find cures for new diseases without
human help, particularly at the molecular level.219 In a world of partial successes,
we would expect ML to be able to identify which treatments work best.
220
214. See supra note 185. For a discussion of the difference between sensor data
and electronic health-record data, and the greater utility and ease of analysis of the sensor
data, see Jyad Batal, Temporal Data Mining for Healthcare Data, in HEALTHCARE DATA
ANALYTICS 379, 380 (Chandan K. Reddy & Cha C. Aggarwal, eds. 2015). Many U.S.
states have regulated limits on the role of so-called physician extenders which might block
this scenario. See Amanda Swanson & Fazal Khan, The Legal Challenge of Incorporating
Artificial Intelligence into Medical Practice, J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 90, 116 (2012).
215. We can dream about replacing hospital administrators, but they likely will be
the last to go.
216. Saurabh Jha & Eric J. Topol, Viewpoint, Adapting to Artificial Intelligence,
316 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 2353, 2354 (2016).
217. Id.
218. See Jessica Leber, Kill Time in Traffic by Diagnosing Cancer, NEO.LIFE
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://medium.com/neodotlife/lou-auguste-and-alexapath-46f7b5f724ca.
219. For a suggestive example of Al being used to find a drug to cure a new
disease, see Jordana Divon, Toronto startup has a faster way to discover effective
medicines, GLOBE & MAIL (July 27, 2015), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
report-on-business/small-business/startups/toronto-startup-has-a-faster-way-to-discover-
effectivemedicines/article25660419/?arc4O4=true (describing use of Al to find potential
treatment for Ebola).
220. This includes noting correlations that have escaped humans. See Andrew H.
Beck et al., Systematic Analysis of Breast Cancer Morphology Uncovers Stromal Features
Associated with Survival, 3 Sci. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 108 (2011),
doi: 10.1126/scitranslmed.3002564 (describing use of "C-Path (Computational
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Researchers are also working on using ML to customize treatments for patients
based on their genetics or on the similarity of their symptoms to earlier success
stories .221
III. DANGERS OF OVER-RELIANCE ON MACHINE LEARNING IN
MEDICINE
Part III is the most speculative, in part because it imagines events farthest
in the future. ML works by using as inputs what is, in effect, big data of medicine:
symptoms, test results, diagnoses, and outcomes from a substantial number of
patients.222 In the case of ML and radiology, the "outcomes" are the opinions of a
panel of physicians who, for example, score images as being of tumors or not
tumors.223 In other cases, and perhaps for future iterations of ML too, the inputs
might be based on real-life outcomes.21 In still other cases, the inputs could be
"synthetic" training data created to train the system, if only as a way of initiating
the system before graduating to what could be a smaller quantity of genuine
patient data.225 In each of these cases, the training process is path dependent, and
the quality of answers depends on how the system is trained.226 Inevitably, the
quality of an Al's outputs is subject to the quality of the data-GIGO (garbage in,
garbage out) remains as true as ever.227 Indeed, there are reasons to worry that
"medical datasets currently available for use by Al researchers are notoriously
biased" in part because their data is drawn from a population that is "extremely
Pathologist)" to identify stromal morphologic structures, a "previously unrecognized
prognostic determinant for breast cancer"); see also David L. Rimm, C-Path: A Watson-
Like Visit to the Pathology Lab, 3 Sci. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 2 (2011), doi:
10.1 126/scitranslmed.3003252 (noting importance and limits of study).
221. Not that this prospect is itself without unique legal issues. See W. Nicholson
Price 11, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419 (2015), for a survey.
222. See Jay, supra note 62.
223. See Marc Kohli, Luciano M. Prevedello, Ross W. Filice & J. Raymond Geis,
Implementing Machine Learning in Radiology Practice and Research, 208 AM. J.
ROENTGENOLOGY 754, 758 (2017), doi: 10.2214/AJR. 16.17224.
224. See generally Tom J Pollard & Leo Anthony Celi, Enabling Machine
Learning in Critical Care, 17 ICUMANAG. PRACT. 198 (2017).
225. Note, however, that choosing to use synthetic data is not without its risks. In
particular, the data may have built-in biases or fail to reflect important but perhaps
unnoticed aspects of genuine data. Cf supra text accompanying note 35 (noting that poor
synthetic data was blamed for failure of Watson's Sloan Kettering experiment).
226. See Syed Shariyar Murtaza et al, How to Effectively Train IBM Watson:
Classroom Experience, 49th HAWAII INT'L CONF. ON SYSTEM SCIS. (2016),
https://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings/hicss/2016/5670/00/5670b663.pdf.
227. See, e.g., Hugh Harvey, Separating the Art of Medicine from Artificial
Intelligence, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Dec. 21, 2017),
https ://towardsdatascience.com/separating-the-art-of-medicine-from-artificial-intelligence-
6582f86ea244 (summarizing literature showing that " [n] ot only are radiologists really quite
bad at writing accurate reports on chest X-rays, they also write entirely different reports to
each other given the same chest X-rays"); Vincent, supra note 157.
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male and extremely white,"" 8 which may increase the attractiveness of proprietary
data sets.229 Nonetheless, as we have seen in Part II, there may come a point where
the reliability of Al is so high that human physicians eem unnecessary or even-
to the extent they may overrule valid diagnoses-unhelpful in that their inputs tend
to reduce the probability of a successful outcome.
As we have seen, some believe that it is already foreseeable that ML will
so displace the diagnostic functions of radiology as to make it a much less
attractive specialization in the near future.230 But what happens once we take the
human physicians out of the equation? Now the outcome data being input into the
ML system are no longer produced by human decisions or Al-plus-human
decisions, but only from outcomes based on ML-generated diagnoses.
This could happen in either of two ways, depending on whether we rely
on ML solely for diagnosis or use it also for identifying the course of treatment
dictated by the diagnosis.
A. Scenario One: Machine Learning Takes Over Diagnosis Only
First, and earlier in time, assume the ML takes over the diagnostic
function from people but human doctors continue to choose the appropriate
treatment. We expect the ML system will be trained from an initial batch of data.
However, when the ML needs new training data-for example as new and
improved sensors or imaging equipment come online-if humans with the
necessary diagnostic training are no longer available because they have been
displaced by machines for too long, we face a problem. Where previously we
could create new training data by consulting expert physicians, now we face the
problem that those expert physicians no longer exist, or perhaps are in very short
supply, since the clinical demand for their services has evaporated.
Relying on ML trained on old training data has problems.231 In this
scenario, there is a danger that the diagnostic decisions in a closed universe of ML
systems might take a wrong path: one not as good as the one that would have been
taken if human physicians continued to provide training data. On the other hand,
trying for an evidence-based approach in which we examine treatment outcomes
based on human treatment decisions and then associate those outcomes with the
diagnostic materials introduces substantial problems of its own. One is that it is a
lot of work. Another is that it can take a long time, because all of the outcomes we
are interested in may take years to manifest.
The training-data problem is potentially very serious, but it is also
complex and subtle, and its severity will be dependent on variables, some of which
are difficult to predict. The nature of the problem likely will depend on both the
future course of ML development and whether the sensor technology producing
228. Dav Gershgorn, If AI is Going to be the World's Doctor, It Needs Better
Textbooks, QUARTZ (Sept. 6, 2018), https://qz.com/1367177/if-ai-is-going-to-be-the-worlds-
doctor-it-needs-better-textbooks/.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 308-19.
230. See supra text accompanying note 200.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
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the raw data that must be graded to produce training data is collected by means
that are invasive or dangerous.
1. Will Machine Learning Continue to Require Huge Data Sets?
At present, most ML systems require substantial quantities of training
data.232 If ML technology were to improve to a point where smaller training sets
sufficed, then it would take fewer doctor-hours to produce training data.233 Unless
and until we achieve that innovation, very large data sets will remain the
prerequisite (and also barrier to entry) to fielding an ML system. Even if the
equipment being used on patients does not change, we may need new data if the
conditions under which the system is used change. For example, if a tumor-
detection system is called on to diagnose smaller tumors, earlier in their growth,
then we need to have data that reflects this type of tumor. Whenever our
understanding of the condition being measured changes, we will need to redo the
training data in light of this new knowledge; that may require regrading training
data used for the first version of the ML and combining that with new data.
The situation changes further when the sensor technology being used on
patients changes. Imagine, for example, that someone invents a higher-resolution
scanner that akes sharper images than its predecessor. Human beings who could
recognize tumors on the old photos might have little or no difficulty recognizing
the same tumors on the new, sharper images; ideally, humans might also be able to
see new things they had not been able to discern or become able to better
distinguish previously ambiguous results. Unfortunately, ML systems do not work
like that.234 To an ML system, the new, higher-resolution image is a completely
new thing, and anyone wanting to field an ML system that can use the new
equipment will first need a whole new corpus of higher-resolution training data
based solely on the new, higher-resolution images.
2. Can Old ML Train New ML?
At present, there is one shortcut that might make producing new training
data easier, but it will be possible only in some cases-and radiology is not one of
them. There are methods by which one ML system can train another, but only if
there is a way of linking the data the old system used to the data input in the new
one.235 Thus, for example, if the ML system were being trained to identify skin
cancers from photographs, it should be possible to take two photos of the
suspected area: one with the old, lower-resolution camera, and one with the new,
232. See Jay, supra note 62.
233. For one attempt to achieve this see Zhe Li et al., Thoracic Disease
Identification and Localization with Limited Supervision, ARXWv:1711.06373 [CS, STAT]
(2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.06373.
234. See the discussion on datapoints that are "independent and identically
distributed" in BISHOP supra note 46, at 26.
235. See Xingchao Peng, Judy Hoffman, Stella X. Yu & Kate Saenko, Fine-to-
Coarse Knowledge Transfer for LowRres Image Classification, IEEE CONFERENCE ON
IMAGE PROCESSING, 2016, at 3683, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/
stamp.j sp?amumber=7533047.
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higher-resolution camera. The lower-resolution photos could be input to the old
ML, and its diagnosis could be used to tag the higher-resolution photo of the same
area that hen would become part of the training data for the new ML system.
Using one ML to train the other in this manner can be effective.236
Subfields of Al, such as pretraining and transfer learning, are concerned with this
problem. 237 The downside is that because a substantial amount of training data will
be required, a large group of patients will have to be subjected to two parallel
diagnostic procedures: the old and the new. If the procedure is a photo of a
person's skin, that is largely a management problem. If it is an NMI, it is also a
substantial, but necessary, expense. But if the procedure is invasive or harmful,
like an x-ray238 or especially a CT-scan,23 9 then it requires exposing a very large
number of patients to additional risk and also ensuring that the patients who
consent to undergo the risk have conditions that are representative of the
population as a whole.
While unsupervised learning, that is training on raw data that has not been
labeled, classified, or categorized, has often been touted as the future of ML, it is
unlikely to be the solution here. Unsupervised learning is most useful in
combination with supervised learning; for example, where unsupervised data is
used for pretraining, outlier removal, and low-dimensional data projection. But
some amount of labeled data is still necessary to express the core concept that the
machine should learn. 240
B. Scenario Two: Machine Learning Takes Over Diagnosis and Treatment
The situation looks even more concerning if ML systems also take on the
job of choosing and applying the course of treatment. Now, we face a closed-loop
system, one in which the outcomes themselves owe their origins to ML-generated
choices. In such a scenario, the very distribution of observed cases and outcomes is
236. See id.
237. See Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521
NATURE 436 (2015), doi: 10.1038/naturel4539; Sinno Jialin Pan & Qiang Yang, A Survey
on Transfer Learning, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE & DATA ENGINEERING 1345,
1345-59 (2010), doi: 10.1109/TKDE.2009.191.
238. Current estimates of the risk of cancer from diagnostic x-rays are small. A
2004 paper estimated that 0.6% of cancers in the UK were due to diagnostic x-rays,
although in other countries that used them more frequently the toll might climb as high as
3%. Amy Berrington de Gonzilez & Sarah Darby, Risk of Cancer from Diagnostic X-rays:
Estimates for the UK and 14 Other Countries, 363 LANCET 345, 345 (2004).
239. A 2009 study found that "the patients who are most frequently imaged have
cumulative risks significantly greater than the typical patient. The top percentile ... have
estimated LARs of cancer incidence in excess of 2.7% (above the baseline 42% cancer
rate), equating to 6% or more of their total expected cancer incidence." Aaron Sodickson et
al., Recurrent CT, Cumulative Radiation Exposure, and Associated Radiation-Induced
Cancer Risks from CT of Adults, 251 RADIOLOGY 175, 180 (2009),
doi: 10.1148/radiol.2511081296.
240. See Dumitru Erhan, Yoshua Bengio, Aaron Courville, Pierre-Antoine
Manzagol, Pascal Vincent & Samy Bengio, Why Does Unsupervised Pre-training Help
Deep Learning? 11 J. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 625 (2010); see also supra note 64.
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a result of the ML system's decision strategy. If the ML system does not consider
the right optimization function, things may derail. 4' When clinicians are in the
decision loop, they have the ability to adjust the optimization criteria-e.g.,
balance symptom reduction with side-effects-and incorporate additional variables
into that criteria-e.g., multiple types of side-effects-to refine the decision
strategy.42 An ML system optimizes a fixed-performance criteria,243 but it does
not have the same normative ability to self-correct and gradually incorporate new
dimensions to its value system.
Before going any further, it may be useful to emphasize the relative
modesty of our claim regarding this scenario. We are not claiming that closed-loop
retraining must result in the degradation of an Al's predictive abilities. And we are
certainly not echoing Juan Mateos-Garcia's claim that "'entropic forces' that
degrade algorithm accuracy will win out in the end: no matter how much more
data you collect, it is just impossible to make perfect predictions about a complex,
dynamic reality"244not least because this claim is addressed primarily to systems
where humans have an incentive to game against the Al,245 a condition that we
trust does not apply to diagnostic medicine. Rather, our concern is whether in the
closed-loop scenario we can be confident that over time the A's diagnoses will
remain of the high quality that originally led the medical and legal systems to
prefer the Al to human diagnosticians. And even if we have some confidence that
degradation is unlikely, as we explain below, there is the larger risk that
improvement will not continue; indeed, especially if we rely on ML to plan and
deliver treatments upon diagnosis, there is some real risk of the ML system
reinforcing its original decisions when some other path might be better.21 6 If, as we
believe, both legal and medical ethics should require that we have this confidence
before we rely solely on Al diagnosticians, then we may have a problem.
Statistical systems require feedback.21 7 "The ideal technique for testing
the obtained model is to use an external validation dataset that is collected
independently of the training dataset on which the model was built."248 Indeed, this
testing and improvement is a continual process.249 Ideally, one would check and
241. See GOODFELLOW, BENGIO & COURVILLE, supra note 56, at 102.
242. See Albert Freitas, Altamiro Costa-Pereira, Pavel Brazdil. Cost-Sensitive
Decision Trees Applied to Medical Data, PROC. 9TH ANN. INT'L CONF. ON DATA
WAREHOUSING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY, 2017, at 303.
243. See GOODFELLOW, BENGIO & COURVILLE, supra note 56, at 102.
244. Juan Mateos-Garcia, To Err Is Algorithm: Algorithmic Fallibility and
Economic Organisation, NESTA (May 10, 2017), https://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/err-
algorithm-algorithmic-fallibility-and-economic-organisation.
245. See id.
246. See infra text accompanying notes 247-70.
247. O'NEIL, supra note 77, at 6.
248. Sanjoy Dey et al., Predictive Models for Integrating Clinical and Genomic
Data, in Reddy & Aggarwal, supra note 214, at 433, 450.
249. See Martin Zinkevich, Rules of Machine Learning: Best Practices for ML
Engineering, MARTIN ZINKEVICH, http://martin.zinkevich.org/mles of mi/rules of ml.pdf
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
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retrain the Al on new data, making for a workflow of collect data, train a model,
get new data, retrain, repeat.250 Retraining does not necessarily require a human in
the loop. But for more complex, real-life problems, retraining may require human
input to check data quality and to generate labels for the new data.25' And here is
where the problem lies: if the Al always recommends a particular drug regime for
a given type of cancer, we will never get any new data on the efficacy of radiation.
As a result, we will never learn whether adiation could end up being better in
some circumstances. In essence, the Al's initial diagnosis decisions will decide the
training examples available downstream.252 Of course, similar problems bedevil
cancer treatments run by humans: ethics and humanity prevent the use of control
groups of patients with deadly diseases.
How much humans need to be involved in ML retraining varies with the
type of problem being solved. Physical processes that can be observed and
measured objectively, like object grasping or motor learning in robotics, lend
themselves to automated retraining,253 essentially via trial and error using
reinforcement learning methods.254 However, we do not wish to subject patients to
random error as an ML system learns by doing. Automated retraining works best
for problems where the preferred objective can be described precisely
(mathematically), such as winning or losing in the game of Go.255 Indeed,
DeepMind's latest Go-playing Al, AlphaGo Zero, learned using no external
training data at all: "With each iteration of self-play, the system learns to become a
stronger player.'2 6 "It can do this efficiently because all the other uncertainties are
known .... There is complete information .... There is a way to measure success.
In short, the behavior of the game of Go is predictable, real world systems
however are not. ' 25 7 In contrast to playing Go, retraining on diagnostic technique
will require human input and supervision until such a time as we can sufficiently




252. See supra text accompanying notes 241-51.
253. Retraining with no humans in the loop is sometimes called "self-supervised
learning." See, e.g., Dave Gershgorn, Google's Robots Are Learning How to Pick Things
Up, POPULAR ScI. (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.popsci.com/googles-robots-are-leaming-
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254. See generally RICHARD S. SUTTON AND ANDREW G. BARTO, REINFORCEMENT
LEARNING: AN INTRODUCTION (2017).
255. Google's AlphaGo Zero is the perfect example of a system that can train
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network." Carlos E. Perez, Why AlphaGo Zero is a Quantum Leap Forward in Deep
Learing, MEDIUM (Oct. 22, 2017), https://medium.com/intuitionmachine/the-strange-loop-
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257. Id.
258. For a description of the technique of "sparse representations"-in which an
Al is trained with general criteria that require less and more general training data, then left
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One might reasonably ask why, once the Al is up and running and
routinely outperforming human doctors, it cannot simply learn from its mistakes.
One part of the answer is that the machine has no natural notion of a "mistake,"
and it must be taught the concept from a human.259 Another part of the answer is
that, at least in the case of tumor detection, we may only learn of the machine's
mistakes several years after the fact, if then.260 Even assuming that medical
systems are engineered to gather the feedback years later, that still leaves the
possibility of an Al running on the wrong path for some significant period of time.
Indeed, Al applications with long delays between prediction and real-world
validation are among those at the greatest risk of "concept drift," a known source
of error.26' Another risk is that learning from new training data can overwrite the
learning from older data, which may not lead to an improvement in
performance,262 although this danger ought o be able to be mitigated by careful
validation against he original training data.
Worse, in some cases, especially if the initial training data has systematic
errors, is that automated feedback, and even human-assisted feedback, can amplify
the errors rather than correct them. 263 Thus, for example, if a crime database is
biased because officers have tended to stop minorities or to patrol
disproportionately in minority neighborhoods, a predictive system based on that
data will continue to steer police in those directions, and the arrests they make will
be seen as confirmation of the initial bias.
264
to train itself, then "fine-tuned" by humans (which includes checking to see if the results
make any sense at all)-see Dinggang Shen et al., Deep Learning in Medical Image
Analysis, 19 ANN. REV. BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 221 (2017), doi: 10.1146/annurev-
bioeng-071516-044442.
259. See the notion of"Evaluation" in Domingos, supra note 47, at 1-2.
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Baltina, How Fast do Tumours Grow?, NOTES ONCOLOGIST (Feb. 26, 2018),
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FOR SCI. CITIES, https://www.wisc.warwick.ac.uk/files/6814/7922/2663/AdamG.pdf
(citations omitted) (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
In the real world, concepts and data distributions are often not stable but
change with time. This problem, known as "concept drift," complicates the task of learning
a model from data and requires special approaches, different from commonly used
techniques, which treat arriving instances as equally important contributors to the target
concept. Among the most popular and effective approaches to handle concept drift is
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For these and other reasons, some computer experts, such as Cathy
O'Neill, have suggested that Al-based predictions should only be relied on if
someone is continuously checking predictions against reality.265 O'Neill thinks AIs
are too prone to error for us to rely on them when making important decisions
unless a human remains in the loop.266 Of course, humans are known to suffer
from the same problems, which is what causes bias in the data to begin with.
Having a human in the loop may help mitigate problems of bias, but it is not in
itself any guarantee.
Some types of updating cause new difficulties. Typically, including new
sensor data in a training set means we can no longer use the old data. And of
course, that new sensor data needs to be associated with "correct" diagnoses for
which, at present, we rely on human experts. Plus, a diagnostic ML with revised
training data based on data derived from improved technology will need to
demonstrate anew that it is at least as good as its predecessor. That requires
validation data, also at present created by humans. However, as noted above,
producing that new data becomes even more difficult if treatment decisions, as
well as diagnoses, have become the province of machines.
Conversely, imagine a period in which new types of data are not coming
on stream, but the ML system is making poor diagnoses. What does it do then? If
the same set of symptoms is producing the same diagnosis in all cases, where will
the ML get the data to suggest which different diagnosis would be better? If the
answer is "nowhere" then we have a problem. 267 Again, the problem is likely even
more serious if ML takes over treatment as well as diagnosis.
Or, even worse, imagine that the data on which the Al relies has been
modified in some way, turning it into a "BadNet." '268 How long would it take
before doctors first suspected, then were able to confirm, the existence of a
problem? As a leading report on robotics and Al recently warned,
The whole field of formal modelling, verification measurement and
performance evaluation of [Robotics and Al (RAI)] systems is still
very much in its infancy: it is critical that one should be able to
prove, test, measure and validate the reliability, performance, safety
and ethical compliance both logically and statistically/
265. See O'NEL, supra note 77, at 208-10.
266. See id.
267. Admittedly, this problem is not unique to ML: clinicians and practitioners
have had to update their priors about symptoms, diagnosis, and treatments as new studies
quantify the race, gender, socioeconomic, and other inequities reflected in medical research
and treatment. See Editorial, Clinical Trials Have Far Too Little Racial and Ethnic
Diversity, Sci. Am. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/clinical-
trials-have-far-too-little-racial-and-ethnic-diversity/. But at least clinicians and practitioners
are able to critique each other. In the case of ML dominance there is a risk that it could take
even longer to identify problems unless there is a corps of experts able to monitor and
identify poor outcomes.
268. For chilling scenarios, see Tianyu Gu et al., BadNets: Identifying
Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain, ARXWv:1708.06733 [cs]
(Aug. 22, 2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1708.06733.
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probabilistically of such RAI systems before they are deployed. It
should be noted that the verification of systems that adapt, plan and
learn will involve the development of new modelling and
verification approaches; moreover, such modelling and verification
is a prerequisite for informed certification and regulation of RAI
systems, which in turn is a factor in public acceptance of RAI.
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Even with better validation protocols than currently exist, human
observers may have real difficulty observing that a problem exists: as systems
become more complex, "human operators may have greater uncertainty regarding
the conditions under which the system will fail" due to an inability to confidently
verify the behavior of the system under all possible operating conditions."27
A further complexity arises if tort law were to respond to the removal of
humans from the decision loop by shifting the frame from malpractice to product
liability. Even if, as discussed above, the unexpected or unforeseen performance of
some ML is not easily understood as a product defect in the usual sense, treating
the ML system as the product invites potential plaintiffs to investigate if there
might have been errors in the design of the ML system, in its "production", or in
its use.271 These concepts emerge from the law's encounter with the assembly
line.27 2 They map imperfectly at best to a creation process in which the "product"
is an algorithm perhaps unknown to its creators, produced by collecting (and
perhaps creating) a mass of data that was used to train the system. Tort law
commonly imposes strict liability for production errors, but the extent of liability
for design errors is controversial, sometimes less, and can be subject to very high
hurdles of proof.273 Thus, whether the data collection and creation process is
considered "design" or something else could have very great consequences for the
potential liability of the creators (and users) of an ML system that makes a harmful
error.274 Because we see these complex issues as unlikely to arise until the still
somewhat-far-off day when ML systems do treatment as well as diagnosis, we
leave these interesting and important questions for another day.
Whether the law will treat ML systems as products or services likely
applies to deep-learning systems in general, and it might be unfair to expect that
future proponents of Al-based healthcare solve it on their own. Either way, there
are two extremely important problems that accompany the delegation of medical
diagnostics and treatment to ML: the extent to which legal as well as economic
269. Joint written evidence submitted by AAAI and UKCRC (ROBO021),
DATA.PARLIAMENT.UK, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/
evidencedocument/science-and-technology-committee/robotics-and-artificia-intelligence/
written/32533.html (cited with approval in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE,
ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2016-17, HC 145, at 16 (UK)) (last visited
Feb. 22, 2019).
270. Scharre, supra note 83, at 17.
271. See supra text accompanying note 189.
272. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
(1973).
273. See generally Conk, supra note 190.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
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pressure will drive actors to prefer the Al over humans, and the risk to life that
might be caused by an over-dependence on Al-produced training data in the future.
In our next Part, we canvass possible solutions to the risk of over-reliance
on Al diagnosticians.
IV. SORTING POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
One of the simplest potential solutions, at least conceptually, is to impose
legal rules or other governance mechanisms that ensure we have an adequate cadre
of human-physician diagnosticians. Of course, the goal is not merely to impose a
quota of warm bodies. It is to retain and retrain scientists and physicians who will
continue experimentation with better solutions,275 and who will maintain a
meaningful and complementary role, working with ML to create new training data,
adjust the performance criteria, and certify the decisions of the ML system. This
aim is clearly in tension with the trends suggested in Parts I and II above and
would certainly be costly.27 6 Nevertheless, we return to this idea after first
canvassing a variety of other potential technical, economic, and legal solutions.
However, one change we do not address is switching the United States to a single-
payer health system. In a single-payer system, such as the one in Canada, it might
be possible to make rules centrally that address the downsides of the success of
ML diagnostic medicine.277 If the United States is to move to single-payer or some
other form of nationalized health system, it will be for reasons of social policy
larger than the encroachments of ML systems on diagnosis and treatment.
A. Desiderata
The perfect, or at least good, solution to avoiding a scenario in which
both legal rules and economic choices result in vastly reduced, if not outright
collapse of, human participation in the improvement of various diagnostic and
treatment specialties (thus eliminating the expertise needed to monitor the
performance of ML systems and to create new training data when needed), would
have the following properties:
* It would be consistent with primum non nocere, in that it would not involve
any rule change with negative side-effects on other areas of law, ethics, or
technology.
* It would at best create incentives to give patients the best medical treatment
affordable. At the very least it would impose no impediment to an evolving
standard of care and would never incentivize the definition of a legal standard
275. We would also need to ensure that there is a mechanism which allows ML
systems to respond quickly to scientific and medical findings by overriding whatever the
ML systems had previously been doing.
276. See supra text accompanying note 174 ("Physicians are expensive to train,
and expensive to keep on staff.").
277. In a government-run, or even private, single-payer medical system, an
administrative order or a national payment rule would presumably suffice to induce
compliance with rules relating to when ML would be allowed to replace doctors, or how
ML should be used more generally.
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of care worse than what could reasonably be provided given the overall state
of the art.
* It would not create incentives that would tend to reduce the progress of
medical research nor tend to leave us less well-able to react to medical
emergencies, such as new diseases and epidemics.
* It would be resistant to, or ideally invulnerable to, the dangers of monoculture
and over-reliance on ML as identified above in Part III.
* It would at best allow capture of any cost savings enabled by new technology.
At the very least it would incentivize cost savings consistent with the ethical
and legal obligations to give patients at least the standard of care, given the
overall state of the art.
* It would have a bottom line that is consistent with the "Standard View" of
biomedical ethics; namely, "that the practice of medicine and nursing are
ineluctably human."'278
Spoiler alert: we do not have a perfect solution that meets all these
criteria. In what follows we discuss various imperfect solutions and warn against
particularly bad ones. Even our best solution has negative characteristics.
One challenge that seems to emerge from what follows results from the
interaction between economic and legal incentives. A change to legal rules that
fails to adequately deal with the effects of the economic incentives likely will not
achieve much because economic imperatives could still dominate: even if
malpractice law does not require reliance on ML, insurers and others may choose
to demand it, to the extent that law permits, if ML cuts costs. So, to be viable, it
would appear that a solution must overcome both sets of incentives.
In spite of this one-two punch, it is important to state as a framing
principle that we should not allow the entanglement of law and economics to
become an impermeable barrier. If pressure from law and cost does indeed lead us
down a path of over-reliance on mechanized medicine, and this truly does create a
risk of either bad outcomes or a reduction in the creation of better outcomes, then
in accord with our bottom-line desiderata stated above, we must be sure not to
relinquish the human element in medicine. This especially includes access to and
human control over the creation of medical knowledge. This point distinguishes
our approach to economic considerations regarding ML from how one might
approach other crucial diagnostics tools, such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). One could decide to bite the bullet on costs with either
technology purely on the basis of the medical benefits that they provide, but the
potential long-run consequences of ML-especially with regards to our ability to
understand, control, and access future medical knowledge-remind us that, in this
case, we need to look beyond short-run economic benefits: both Kantian- and
278. Supra note 88.
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utilitarian-based ethics may support the need for a human-centered approach to
medicine.
27 9
B. Should We Trust the Private Sector to Solve the Problem?
A common answer, at least in the United States, to problems that have
both an economic and legal component is that we should let the market decide.
Proponents of market solutions tend to argue that the market should be seen as the
default and that any claim for government intervention must be justified by the
existence of a (significant) market failure.280 These arguments ring somewhat
hollow in the context of the U.S. health-care market, an arena in which the market
is notoriously dysfunctional due to issues on both the demand side (patients are not
able to shop well due to pricing and quality opacity
281 plus bounded rationality,282
and even more so when the patient is ill or unconscious) and the supply side (local
monopolies,283 distortions caused by our payment and insurance rules).
284
ML systems that displace doctors will add an additional market
imperfection to the pile. We have suggested that, left to operate in the market such
as it currently is, there is a danger that effective ML diagnostic systems will create
conditions in which doctors no longer get the training and experience that hey
need to become expert enough to create high-quality training data.285 It is as if
physicians today, by learning on the job, are creating a positive externality:
acquiring the skill and judgment needed to create great training data.286 The
279. See generally Jharna Mandal, Dinoop Korol Ponnambath & Subhash
Chandra Parijal, Utilitarian and Deontological Ethics in Medicine, 6 TROPICAL
PARASITOLOGY 5 (2016), doi: 10.4103/2229-5070.175024.
280. See GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 12 (8th ed. 2016) ("There
are two broad rationales for a government to intervene in the economy and change the
allocation of resources that people would choose on their own: to promote efficiency or to
promote equality.... Economists use the term market failure to refer to a situation in which
the market on its own fails to produce an efficient allocation of resources.").
281. Stephen R. Latham, Richard Epstein on Healthcare, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REv.
727, 733-34 (2000) ("Healthcare markets suffer from a number of imperfections that
virtually assure that a series of completed voluntary transactions will not maximize social
utility. For example: demand for health services is irregular and unpredictable; uncertainty
as to the quality and efficacy of proposed medical treatments plagues both the demand and
the supply side, and is not resolved by post-treatment observation of outcomes; the
pervasive use of insurance creates risks of moral hazard; and even without insurance there
are ineradicable agency problems in the patient-doctor relationship."); see also Abigail R.
Moncrieff, The Individual Mandate as Healthcare Regulation: What the Obama
Administration Should Have Said in NFIB v. Sebelius, 39 AM. J.L. & MED 539, 544-47
(2013).
282. See, e.g., Daniel Young, Curing What Ails Us: How the Lessons of
Behavioral Economics Can Improve Health Care Markets, 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 461,
468 (2012).
283. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly
Problem in Health Care, 89 OR. L. REv. 847, 848 (2011).
284. See, e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 281, at 562.
285. See supra Part 11.
286. We are indebted to Andres Sawicki for this analogy.
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introduction of the ML system removes the opportunity for gaining this experience
and in time removes the replacement supply of doctors in the effected specialty,
thus removing the occasion for the positive externality's production (or, if you
prefer, the ML system is causing a negative externality of its own).
287
Of course, the classic answer to an externality problem is to internalize it.
And it could be argued that in the case of ML systems the internalization comes
built-in: the firms that want to market next-generation ML systems will have all
the incentive needed to ensure that they have a stable of well-qualified physicians
able to create training data whenever it is required.
We are not prepared to say this could never happen; it is theoretically
possible. However, we are quite skeptical that it would actually happen for a
number of reasons. In order for the market to overcome the effects we have
described one must believe all of the following things strongly enough to base
public-health policy on them (in order of decreasing plausibility):
ML-system providers will have large enough income streams to keep a
significant number of doctors on staff full- or part-time. Firms will do so
despite the fact that the pace of technical change is notoriously unpredictable
and it might be years between generations of sensors that would necessitate a
new set of training data.
288
* ML-system providers will find a way to train their doctors other than having
them diagnose patients in a world where both patients and healthcare
providers prefer the machine. Firms could, for example, ask their staff doctors
to shadow machines and compare their diagnoses to the ML systems'
diagnoses.
* Persons attracted to the practice of medicine will find this work, which does
have long-run benefits to society, sufficiently interesting and fulfilling to
choose it over medicine with more immediate and tangible benefits to
patients.
289
* What is more, those persons will be doctors of comparable quality and, in
time, experience to the doctors currently relied on for training data.290 (Recall
287. Medicine is not known for dealing well with externalities. Consider, for
example, how the over-use of antibiotics has contributed to the evolution of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria.
288. For example, the average life-span of an MRI scanner exceeds 11 years. See
Average MRI Scanner Nearing Adolescence, DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.diagnosticimaging.com/mri/average-mri-scanner-nearing-adolescence (stating
average age in 2013 was 11.4 years).
289. For evidence that medical students are already avoiding radiology due to the
fear of displacement by Al, see Bo Gong et al., supra note 203.
290. For one suggestive account of how this goes wrong, see Beane, supra note 9
at 1. Beane's ethnographic study found that the introduction of robotic surgery gravely
harmed the training of new surgeons:
[R]obotic surgery greatly limited trainees' role in the work, making
approved methods ineffective. Learning surgery in this context required
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the GIGO principle-unless the training data are of high quality, the ML
system's diagnoses cannot be.)
To trust in the market solution, one needs to believe all these things and to believe
them strongly enough to gamble public health on them.
C. Possible Technical and Economic Changes
We could attempt o engineer the national health system to enjoy as much
of the benefit of ML's enhanced diagnostic abilities a possible without falling into
the trap of monoculture or an over-reliance on ML. Depending on their nature,
technical changes can be required by law, by the imposition of agreed standards, or
self-imposed in response to ethical or market concerns.
1. Create a Control Group?
A potential technical solution would be to divide the population into two
groups. One group would receive ML-informed care, while the other group, the
control, would not. This is likely a non-starter if one is convinced that ML is better
than physicians, because the control group would then be getting substandard care.
The ethical and legal difficulties are complex.
2 91
Beyond ethical questions are the practical concerns: running a very large
control group would be highly impractical. Not only would it be difficult to decide
how big the control group needed to be, but it would be equally challenging to
decide how long the experiment needed to run before we reach conclusive
results.292 For most ML systems, there is at present no obvious point beyond which
we can safely say that if the problems we have identified have yet to manifest we
are likely in the clear forever.293 Conversely, there is no extant standard by which
we can decide the ML is so good that the problems we highlighted above are no
longer a concern.
294
Yet, without a control group, relying on human physicians to spot and
correct an ML system's errors or especially failures to improve is perilous because
the human doctors may not have anything to compare to in order to help them
notice. If competing firms have equal access to the entire database, or have access
to separate databases that are roughly equal in size and quality, competition might
supply the needed monitoring. Unfortunately, for reasons discussed below, access
what I call "shadow learning": an interconnected set of norm- and
policy-challenging practices enacted extensively, opportunistically, and
in relative isolation that allowed only a minority of robotic surgical
trainees to come to competence.
Id.
291. See generally CHARLOTTE LEVY, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW: LEGAL &
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (1975).
292. See Kenneth Jung, Nigam H. Shah, Implications of Non-Stationariy on
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to data may prove to be a substantial barrier to entry unless the law changes in
some way.
295
2. Require a "Red Team" and a "Blue Team"?
A slightly less bad variant on the control-group solution might be to
divide the population into two or more groups, each of which would be separate
for database purposes, and have the different groups' data be used by different ML
systems. Thus, in effect, we have Dr. Abdul Watson, Dr. Betty Watson, and Dr.
Chia Watson and so on, each using a different population's data to shape their
advice. Every so often-how often? and how?-they would have a virtual medical
conference in which they exchange their "best ideas" (or would that be their most
telling data?) and in effect upgrade each other's diagnostic suggestions. This seems
a poor solution because in the usual case an ML system's accuracy is positively
correlated with the size of the database.29 6 It follows that splitting the database into
shards creates a risk of sub-optimal care for everyone. Furthermore, different
systems may offer different trade-offs-e.g., more/less Type I vs Type II error;
more explainability vs more accuracy-so cannot be compared directly.
3. Alternate AIs?
A third, and perhaps better although somewhat unlikely, technical
solution might be to allow each ML to have the same full database297 but require
that their programming or training differ in some meaningful way-if this
difference can be defined, measured, and (most importantly) maintained, all
without subjecting one group to inferior treatment. Using multiple models can add
accuracy; were one model best, ethics and law might force us to use it uniquely. 298
If this condition holds over time, the diagnostic problem becomes akin to
the hurricane-forecasting problem currently faced by meteorologists. There are
several competing models, some with different algorithms, others with different
coverage, and "[t]he best forecasts are made by combining the forecasts from three
295. See infra text accompanying notes 308-19.
296. While this is generally true it also depends on factors such as data quality
and sometimes also data composition, such as the ratio between negatives to positives in the
data set. See, e.g., Rafal Kurczab & Andrej J. Bojarski, The Influence of the Negative-
Positive Ratio and Screening Database Size on the Performance of Machine Learning-
Based Virtual Screening, 12 PLoS ONE, Apr. 6, 2017,
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175410.
297. A valuable byproduct of a national ML system is that we would not only
have more and thus better data for ML systems to chew on, but we would also have
valuable public-health data. Identifying environmental issues, e.g., cancer clusters, will be
much easier if all patients' diagnostic info is going into a national database in a standard
format.
298. This follows from the argument in Part I, that if an ML system is better than
humans, it will become the required standard of care. Logically, the same should apply if
one is choosing between competing ML systems: if there are consistent differences between
the different ML systems, then unless there are great cost differences, we would expect the
best one to become the standard of care.
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or more models into a 'consensus' forecast. 12 99 One group of researchers recently
demonstrated that a consensus of multiple models plays Atari video games better
than any of the models alone.300 Because Atari video games are like Go in that
identifying the "success" criteria is automatic and requires no human input,3' the
applications to medical diagnostics remain, at best, for the future. Nonetheless, the
use of ensemble learning has often been shown to surpass a single learner.
30 2
Achieving this scenario would require us to overcome a number of legal
and economic complexities. First, we would probably need to have multiple
competing providers of Al diagnostic services, for it is hard to see what would
incentivize a single firm to provide multiple possibly conflicting diagnostic
suggestions. Second, we would need to evolve a standard of care that addressed
whether it would suffice to consult (purchase) just one Al model or whether
multiple Al opinions would be required. Third, we would need to evolve a method
of combining, or sorting among, the competing diagnoses if AIs disagreed that
would not expose the person making the decision to unreasonable liability.
Having multiple competing providers of Al diagnostic services that each
use a different algorithm should prevent diagnostic monoculture. But any plan that
intends to rely on multiple providers must address economic and legal obstacles to
creating and sustaining multiple providers.
The economic obstacle arises from the nature of the industry, a special
case of the winner-take-all phenomenon often observed in markets relying on new
technology.30 3 We noted above that the economics of deep-learning neural
networks involved high fixed costs, including the cost of gathering and formatting
the training data, the cost of designing and tuning the relevant algorithms, and
perhaps (although here predictions vary) the cost of the equipment hosting the
299. Jeff Maters, Hurricane and Tropical Cyclones, WEATHER UNDERGROUND,
https://www.wunderground.com/hurricane/models.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). We are
indebted to Jonathan Frankle for pointing us to weather models as an analogy.
300. Matteo Hessel et al., Rainbow: Combining Improvements in Deep
Reinforcement Learning, ARXIv:1710.02298 [CS] (Oct. 6, 2017),
http://arxiv.org/abs/1710.02298.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 255-56.
302. BIsHoP, supra note 46, at 653; Saso Deroski & Bernard Zenko, Is
Combining Classifiers Better than Selecting the Best One?, 54 MACHINE LEARNING 255,
267 (2004), doi: 10.1023/B:MACH.0000015881.36452.6e.
303. For discussions of the general phenomenon of winner-take-all in high-
technology industries see, for example, Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1998); Ronald Cass,
Antitrust And High-Tech: Regulatory Risks for Innovation And Competition, FEDERALIST
SOCIETY (June 28, 2013), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/antitrust-and-high-
tech-regulatory-risks-for-innovation-and-competition; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed
Antitrust Approach To High Technology Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 65, 87
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Robert H. Frank, Sherwin Rosen & Kevin M. Murphy, The
Wages Of Stardom: Law And The Winner-Take-All Society: A Debate, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 1 (1999).
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Al." °4 Indeed, a widely quoted analysts' report recently cast doubt on the profit
potential of IBM's Watson despite its being "one of the more mature and broad
cognitive computing platforms today" precisely because users face a high cost of
data gathering and curation.3 5 However, in contrast, the marginal cost of
diagnosing a patient is comparatively small.30 6 This account of high fixed costs and
low marginal costs resembles the economic profile of a so-called natural monopoly
in most respects,30 7 save one: other than the contingent question of whether there is
sufficient demand to support the capital costs of running multiple competing AIs,
there is nothing that is an absolute barrier to entry.
For the multiple-competing-provider scheme to work, all providers need
access to sufficient training data,30 8 and ideally, they all would have access to all of
it because large data sets tend to increase accuracy.309 Some firms may, however,
be able to interpose a legal obstacle to their rivals' access to training data. Training
data is not inherently rivalrous. Training an Al is not like siting a water turbine on
a river, where there can be only one at any point.310 But early indications are that
would-be providers of Al health-related services see their access to data as a
304. See supra text accompanying notes 176-80.
305. James Kisner et al., Creating Shareholder Value with Al? Not so Elementary,
My Dear Watson, EQUITY RESEARCH AMERICAS: JEFFERIES FRANCHISE NOTE (July 12,
2017), https://javatar.bluematrix.com/pdf/fO5xWjc (rating IBM "underperform" due to
doubts about Watson).
306. See AJAY AGRAWAL, JOSHUA GANS & AvI GOLDFARB, PREDICTION
MACHINES: THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 7-20 (2018).
307. OECD GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS AND
COMPETITION LAW 62 (R. S. Khemani & D. M. Shapiro eds., 1993) ("Generally speaking,
natural monopolies are characterized by steeply declining long-run average and marginal-
cost curves such that there is room for only one firm to fully exploit available economies of
scale and supply the market.").
308. "Deep learning requires very large quantities of data in order to build up a
statistical picture." Alex Hem, Why Data is the New Coal, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2016)
(quoting Imperial College Professor Murray Shanahan),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/27/data-efficiency-deep-learning.
309. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Cancer Institute
are partnering in a "three-year pilot project called the Joint Design of Advanced Computing
Solutions for Cancer," designed to assemble and integrate large amounts of data about how
tumors respond to treatment. Argonne National Laboratory, Cancer's Big Data Problem,
COMMS. ACM (Oct. 21, 2016), http://cacm.acm.org/careers/208869-cancers-big-data-
problem/fulltext.
310. See James Bradford Delong & A. Michael Froomkin, Speculative
Microeconomics for Tomorrow's Economy, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE
ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 (Brian Kahin & Hal
Varian Eds., 2000) (discussing economic consequences of non-rivalrous nature of data).
However, patenting an ML system would, create at least a temporary monopoly. For a
discussion of how to draft patent specifications for an ML system see Vincent Spinella-
Mamo, Patenting Algorithms: IP Case Law and Claiming Strategies, IPFOLIo BLOG,
http://blog.ipfolio.com/patenting-algorithms-ip-case-law-and-claiming-strategies (last
visited Feb. 24, 2019).
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strategic asset to which they wish to have exclusive access.]" If our strategy for
avoiding monoculture relies on having multiple equally competent providers, then
as Amanda Levendowski has argued in the context of avoiding training bias, the
legal system may need to remove existing regulatory obstacles to data sharing.
Levendowski suggests that using training data be will often be a fair use.312 But if
trade secret and proprietary first-mover advantages are among the main obstacles
to access,313 then even a copyright workaround may not be enough; in time we
may need to impose some sort of compulsory-licensing scheme on holders of the
data. Compulsory-license schemes require the owner of an intellectual-property
right to share it on reasonable terms.314 U.S. law does not tend to give compulsory
licenses, but they do exist as antitrust remedies315 and in relatively unusual
provisions of existing law relating to patents in essential foods316 and atomic
energy,317 and for copyrights in certain music.318 Then again, foreign companies
311. An example is Google's DeepMind's deal to get access to data provided by
the UK's National Health Service. The terms of the deal caused a panel of external
reviewers to warn that DeepMind could "exert excessive monopoly power" by using
technological means to deny competitors effective access to the data. See Natasha Lomas,
UK Report Warns DeepMind Health Could Gain 'Excessive Monopoly Power',
TECHCRUNCH (Jun 15, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/15/uk-report-warns-
deepmind-health-could-gain-excessive-monopoly-power/. DeepMind later handed the
patient data to Google despite "explicit reassurances made by DeepMind's founders that
there was a firewall sitting between its health experiments and its ad tech parent, Google."
Natasha Lomas, Google Gobbling DeepMind's Health App Might Be the Trust Shock We
Need, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 14, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/14/google-gobbling-
deepminds-health-app-might-be-the-trust-shock-we-need/.
312. Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence's
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 619-30 (2018).
313. For a daunting list of obstacles, see Richard Blunk & Eric Armstrong,
Technology Legal Interoperability: Initial Steps Towards an Analytical Framework,
PRIVACY & DATA SEC. LAW RES. CTR. (BLOOMBERG BNA),
http://privacylaw.bna.com/pvrc/7057/split display.adp?fedfid=12112225 1&vname=pvlrnot
allissues&jd=0000015da36bd172abdfeb7fbdf90002&split=0 (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
314. Strictly speaking, in the United States the government sets the price of the
license, so while the price will be lower than what the holder of the IP would have charged,
it will not inevitably be reasonable; operationally compulsory licensing is much more
efficient once the government determines the need for the license because the price
negotiations cannot be contentious beyond a point. See Srividhya Ragavan, Brendan
Murphy & Raj Dav6, Frand v. Compulsory Licensing: The Lesser of the Two Evils, 14
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 83, 116 (2015).
315. See United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 343 U.S. 444, 447 (1952) (imposing
compulsory licensing on a "fair" basis).
316. 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012) (empowering Secretary of Agriculture to "declare a
protected variety open to use on a basis of equitable remuneration to the owner, not less
than a reasonable royalty, when the Secretary determines that such declaration is necessary
in order to insure an adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed in this country and that the
owner is unwilling or unable to supply the public needs for the variety at a price which may
reasonably be deemed fair").
317. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2012).
318. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
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based in countries that have national policies designed to encourage access to
training data as part of a pro-Al industrial policy may fill the gap without the need
for radical changes in U.S. law.
31 9
4. Encourage Transparency?
A big part of what makes the monoculture story troubling is how difficult
it could be to detect a problem if it occurred. As we noted above, decision-making
by deep-learning-based Al is notoriously opaque.3 20 For example, IBM Watson, as
currently engineered, does not clearly explain its decision-making processes in
terms that are understandable to most humans.3 21 It is possible to formally trace (in
the computer's memory) how Watson made its decisions, but it takes time and
effort to understand the result of that trace. 22 The same problem is present in other
ML systems.
323
Although researchers are increasingly aware of the need for "explainable
Al," we are still far from something the average doctor could use in real time to
help decide what weight to put on a diagnosis.3 24 To the extent, for example, that
the explanation consists of a set of weights of various bits of evidence without
much in the way of context as to how the neural network chose those weights,
325
319. As Chinese Al expert and investor Kai-Fu Lee says, "[t]he U.S. and Canada
have the best Al researchers in the world, but China has hundreds of people who are good,
and way more data." Will Knight, China's AlAwakening, MIT TECH. REv. (Oct. 10, 2017)
(quoting Mr. Lee), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609038/chinas-ai-awakening/; see
also Dame Wendy Hall & Jrome Pesenti, Growing the Artificial Intelligence Industry in
the UK, UK DEP'T FOR DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT AND UK DEP'T FOR Bus.,
ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads
/system/uploads/attachment data/file/652097/Growing the artificial intelligence industry
in the UK.pdf (making multiple recommendations to facilitate UK-based Al access to
training data).
320. See supra note 74-76; see also Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Accountability of
Al Under the Law: The Role of Explanation, ARXWv:1711.01134 [CS, STAT] (Nov. 3, 2017),
http://arxiv.org/abs/1711.01134 (discussing technical requirements for Al systems that
could provide kinds of explanations that are currently required of humans in light of EU
GDPR); Aaron M. Bornstein, Is Artificial Intelligence Permanently Inscrutable?, LEARNING
NAUTILUS (Sept. 1, 2016), http://nautil.us/issue/40/learning/is-artificial-intelligence-
permanently-inscrutable (last visited Sep 7, 2016); Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the
Heart of Al, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ (describing
"Deep Patient" and Al that can "anticipate the onset of psychiatric disorders like
schizophrenia surprisingly well" using methods opaque to its designers).
321. See Hamm, supra note 197.
322. See id. (describing how Watson erroneously concluded Toronto was in the
United States). Similar attempts have been made to reconstruct AlphaGo's move #37 in
game #2 of the first match against Lee Sedol. Cade Metz, In Two Moves, AlphaGo and Lee
Sedol Redefined the Future, WIRED (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/two-
moves-alphago-lee-sedol-redefined-future/.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 41 and 75.
325. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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we are a long way from the user-friendly, easy-to-use summary a doctor would
need. Moving in that direction, we now have neural networks that can provide a
confidence number with the decision.3 26 Humans can then use that information to
prioritize checking the results with lower confidence.3 27 However, this presumes
that the confidence estimate is sufficiently well informed, i.e., that the machine
"knows what it knows." So far ML can only guarantee this in some limited
settings.1
21
Researchers today are actively working on the explainability problem,
3 29
and thus there is reason to hope that it will get better. The more that an ML system
can provide an explanation for its diagnoses, the more scope there will be for
people to evaluate it meaningfully and, one presumes, spot mistakes or add
value.330 It follows that the "centaur" model33' is most likely to endure if Al
becomes less opaque, because there will still be something meaningful for people
to do. However, as noted above, should there come a point where the Al is so good
that humans are not adding value, all the arguments we make here come rushing
back into play.
326. See generally Robert Tibshirani, A Comparison of Some Error Estimates for
Neural Network Models, 8 NEURAL COMPUTATION 152 (1996),
doi: 10.1162/neco.1996.8.1.152.
327. See Richard Dybowski & Stephen J. Roberts, Confidence Intervals and
Prediction Intervals for Feedforward Neural Networks, in CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF
ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 298, 298-326 (Richard Dybowski & Vanya Grant eds.,
2001).
328. See Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability,
ARXWv: 1606.03490 [CS, STAT] (June 10, 2016), http://arxiv.org/abs/I606.03490,
329. Examples include Dong Huk Park et al., Attentive Explanations: Justifying
Decisions and Pointing to the Evidence, arXiv:1612.04757v2 (July 25, 2017),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.04757 (using eural-network-based, natural-language processing,
and generation techniques to cooperatively explain the behavior of other neural networks);
Leilani Gilpin, Reasonableness Monitors, TWENTY-THIRD AAAI/SJGAI DOCTORAL
CONSORTRUM, https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAA18/paper/viewFile/17361/
16430 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (using deductive reasoning to create a "reasonableness
monitor" that detects when cyberphysical systems violate rules encoded in formal logic);
Tao Lei, Regina Barzilay & Tommi Jaakkola, Rationalizing Neural Predictions,
arXiv:1606.04155v2 (Nov. 2, 2016), https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04155 (exploring how to
determine the minimum fragment of the input to a neural network necessary for the decision
it reached, thus offering some clarity about the network's rationale). We are grateful to
Jonathan Frankle for pointing us to these examples. See also Rudin & Ustun, supra note 41,
at 1 (arguing that "[t]here is new technology to build transparent machine learning models
that are often as accurate as black box machine learning model"). For a cautionary view,
however, see Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REv. 1085 (2018) (warning that "explanation" may make ML
systems less inscrutable but will not necessarily make it easier to understand whether their
conclusions are justified).
330. See Editorial, Towards Trustable Machine Learning, NATURE BIOMEDICAL
ENGINEERING 2, 709-10 (Oct. 10, 2018), doi: 10.1038/s41551-018-0315-x.
331. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing centaur chess).
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5. Tax ML to Change Incentives?
If the medical industry seeks to substitute ML for the work of a medical
specialty, such as radiology, we would expect that in the short term radiologists'
salaries might drop, blunting the economic pressure to eliminate them. But, as we
have argued above, in the longer run, demand could shrink to near zero;
meanwhile, those medical students whose choice of specialty is influenced by
salary will avoid that specialty.
One way to discourage over-reliance on ML, therefore, is to change the
economic calculus using tax law. If we can maintain a role for doctors in a manner
that is more attractive financially, that will remove the economic incentive to
undermine human participation in diagnostic decisions and the planning and
delivery of treatment. The malpractice-law incentive to choose ML would remain,
but as we discuss below, there are some possible legal solutions that do not address
the economics, and thus a tax solution might be combined with a legal solution.
To the extent that we see the growth of ML as imposing a negative
externality on the medical system as a whole (or undermining an existing positive
externality), a classic remedy would be a Pigouvian tax (or subsidy).32 A
Pigouvian tax on a negative externality (or subsidy on a positive one) is designed
to reflect the true social cost (or value) of the activity.' Thus, in theory, one could
either tax the use of ML, subsidize the employment of human physicians, or
both-perhaps even having the ML tax provide the funds for the subsidies. The
idea of a robot tax is a popular one, having been endorsed by none less than
science and tech celebrities such as Bill Gates,334 Elon Musk,335 and Stephen
Hawking 3 6 The idea of a tax has also been criticized as impractical, given we do
not have agreed definitions of what constitutes a robot,337 a critique that applies
with nearly equal force to Al and ML. The EU Parliament flirted with the idea of a
332. "Most economists believe that the government should impose Pigouvian
taxes on firms that produce negative externalities like pollution." Jonathan S. Masur & Eric
A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 93, 138 (2015).
333. Id.
334. See Kevin J. Delaney, The Robot That Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes,
Says Bill Gates, QUARTZ (Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-
takes-your-job-should-pay-taxes/.
335. See Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk: Robots Will Take Your Jobs, Government
Will Have to Pay Your Wage, CNBC (Nov. 4, 2016),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/04/elon-musk-robots-will-take-your-jobs-government-will-
have-to-pay-your-wage.html.
336. See Doug Bolton, Stephen Hawking Says Robots Could Make Us All Rich




337. See, e.g., Robert J. Kovacev, The Challenges of Administering a Robot Tax,
LAw360 (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/967115/the-challenges-of-
administering-a-robot-tax.
2019] WHEN AIS OUTPERFORM DOCTORS 93
robot tax but ultimately rejected it. 8 The biggest problem, not considered by any
of the proposals mentioned here is that, in our view, the ultimate aim of the tax is
not to create en masse disincentives for the development of effective medical ML
but, rather, to incentivize the successful development of (centaur-type) ML that
leaves a meaningful role for human doctors and, most importantly, avoids
monoculture by ensuring human access to future medical knowledge and know-
how.
How to devise a tax strategy that achieves these ends might prove an
insurmountable challenge. In any event, a tax on ML would ultimately be a loss for
patients, who would see costs rise; a subsidy from general revenues would not hurt
patients as directly.33 9 But to the extent that the tax discouraged medical service
providers from using ML, patients would suffer from being deprived of a diagnosis
that (ex-ante) has a higher probability of being correct.
6. Tax ML to Support an Expert Corps of Radiologists?
Rather than trying to change incentives, which involves nearly impossible
measurement issues, a more interesting scenario would be to set the ML tax at a
level sufficient to support a corps of expert radiologists who would be charged
with keeping tabs on the ML systems' accuracy, creating new training data as
needed, conducting research to improve detection and analysis of scan data, and
responding to medical emergencies.
Because there will be few if any relevant market signals, one should not
underestimate the difficulty of fixing the right size of such a corps, determining its
budget, and recruiting and training highly competent persons to join it.
Nevertheless, the idea of a reserve corps of specialists at the National Institute of
Health, or perhaps spread out among teaching hospitals, does have some allure.
Because it would be much smaller than the current number of radiologists,
supporting a group of experts would presumably be less expensive than attempting
to preserve the entire profession, even at reduced salaries.
An important challenge in setting up such a corps is in designing the
appropriate training curriculum for these experts. The ideal profile would be
people with both medical training and advanced ML training.340 This is a
challenging program of study.34' The shift in curriculum, requiring medical
students to incorporate training in probability, statistics, and algorithms, may prove
hard to sell for some of the more conservative medical faculties.
338. European Parliament Calls for Robot Law, Rejects Robot Tax, REUTERS
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-robots-lawmaking/european-
parliament-calls-for-robot-law-rejects-robot-tax-idUSKBN15V2KM.
339. Patients may suffer indirect harm to the extent that the subsidy from general
revenues requires additional taxes that either fall on them or on others who increase prices
or reduce wages as a result.
340. See Patricia Balthazar, Training Medical Students and Residents for the AI
Future, DATA ScI. INST. AM. C. OF RADIOLOGY (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.acrdsi.org/Blog/Medical-schools-must-prepare-trainees.
341. See id.
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D. Possible Changes to Legal Rules
1. Revive the Locality Rule?
In Section I.C we showed how the demise of the locality rule eliminated
the ability of physicians to assert a defense of custom, local or otherwise. This, we
argued, makes malpractice an engine that will drive the progression toward Al
monoculture or at least toward a potentially dangerous over-reliance on ML.
Would a return to the locality rule stop this trend and thus prevent malpractice law
from creating the incentives that would tend to make ML displace too many
doctors?
The answer is that it would not. Even if the revival of the locality rule was
able to delay or blunt malpractice law's impetus to switch to ML, it seems unlikely
that a (politically improbable) revival of the locality rule would do much to
prevent the problems we have identified above: so long as ML seems to offer
significant accuracy increases and cost savings, the push to adopt it and in time
reduce the use of human doctors will remain strong. As a result, the hospitals,
insurers, and private medical practices that choose not to use ML will in time find
themselves painted as outliers and laggards even when compared to other hospitals
and physicians who are similarly situated geographically or by type of practice. 
3 42
Furthermore, unless the revival of the locality rule was narrowly cabined
to Al-based medical technology, it could have vast and unpredictable side-effects
as it infected first malpractice claims generally, and then perhaps other areas of the
law of professional negligence. As law and economics scholars have shown, the
locality rule imposes substantial costs on society because it disincentivizes
innovation, which means that patients will lose the advantages they would have
gained from the adoption of new medical technology.3 43 Intuitively, the long-term
costs in lost advances would seem very likely to exceed the value of any temporary
gains.
2. Create a Broad "ML Exception" to Malpractice Law?
Perhaps, therefore, instead of looking for a broad-brush solution, we
should just create a judicial or legislative "ML Exception" to malpractice law, by
which we would agree that failing to use an ML system in diagnosis is not
malpractice.
Unfortunately, this broad ML Exception suffers from most of the same
problems as the idea that we might revive the locality rule: it fails to take account
of economic incentives to deploy ML, which exist independently from the push
provided by malpractice law.3 44 Also, like the locality-rule revival, the broad ML
Exception also seems likely to impose greater social costs than benefits, for to the
extent that it removes an incentive to use ML even carefully, it degrades the
quality of patient care.
342. See supra Subsection I.C.1.
343. See generally Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 124.
344. See supra Section I.A. The incentives could, however, be overcome by taxes.
See supra Subsection JV.C.5.
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3. Create a Narrow "ML Exception" to Malpractice Law?
If a broad ML Exception is too much, how about a more narrowly tailored
one, such as a rule that a human doctor's overruling of an ML system is not
malpractice unless grossly negligent, but that failing to do so when needed would
be actionable error. In other words, the standard of care would still require
consulting the ML, but it would not be per se error to deviate from its diagnostic
conclusions. Indeed, we might go further and say the ML's diagnosis was not
admissible evidence, although this is probably only a short-term fix at best: over
time one would expect that juries would come to understand that ML was the norm
and expect to hear about its diagnosis.345
This narrower exception would not relieve medical providers from
liability for failing to use ML once it became the standard of care but would
provide a safe harbor from liability for overruling an ML system unless the
human's decision was indefensible. We suggested above that under current
liability rules, especially in the increasing number of states that have abandoned
the locality rule, even human doctors who believe with some justice that their
diagnoses are better than the computer's will face moral risks and obstacles in
displacing the Al's suggestion.346 If nothing else, we suggested, the fact that ML
has a better success rate will mean that the physician will run a very great
malpractice risk in supplanting its judgment, and that insurers will be loath to
permit such decisions as a result. The second form of the ML Exception removes,
or at least greatly reduces, this risk. In so doing, it departs from the pattern in other
contexts, such as piloting, where we believe machines outpace humans.347
The second part of the exception, in which human doctors are liable for
failing to overrule an ML system when they should have, is not on its face a
change from current law. Under current law, an ML system, being a machine, has
no identity nor agency for legal purposes, and hence its decisions will in all cases
be ascribed to the human(s) or corporation(s) responsible for acting on its
diagnoses.3 48 On the other hand, once ML has a better batting average than the
average human, it will, as we've said repeatedly, be a courageous human who
overrules it in any but the most obvious cases.3 49 Under current law, cases in which
the computer's decision was arguably plausible but courageously overruled
anyway will invite litigation if the outcome goes badly, but cases where the doctor
345. As the use of Al becomes increasingly routine and enters into popular
culture, we would expect that jurors will expect to hear about what the system
recommended, much like the "CSI effect," see Caroline Kensey, CSI: From the Television
to the Courtroom, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 318-31 (2012), is said to shape juror
demands for scientific evidence today. Id. at 320-21.
346. Cf. Millar & Kerr, supra note 11.
347. "A court may... infer negligence on the part of the pilot from evidence that
suggests that the pilot switched from automatic pilot to manual in a crisis situation." James
E. Cooling & Paul V. Herbers, Considerations in Autopilot Litigation, 48 J. AiR L. & COMM.
693, 710 (1983).
348. See Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How Should the Law Think About
Robots, in ROBOT LAW 4 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2017).
349. See supra Section I.E.
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should have overridden the computer but did not will be much harder for plaintiffs
to prove if and when ML alone becomes the standard of care.350
Thus, the second part of the exception can be characterized as no more
than a savings clause: a way to emphasize that while liability for overruling ML is
changing, liability for not using ML and for not overruling it remains in place.
Alternately, one can see the second clause as a means to emphasize the importance
of keeping a human in the loop: liability will lie not only for failing to use ML
when one should but also for failing to overrule it when one should.
Although undoubtedly preferable to any of the rules canvassed so far, the
social-welfare consequences of this narrower ML Exception are hard to predict
with any certainty. Even if we assume, somewhat heroically, that on average
humans will overrule ML approximately as often as we would want them to, that
leaves open the door for errors in both directions, i.e., overruling the ML system
when it was right, and failing to overrule the ML system when it was wrong. The
patients in the first group, who would have had the benefit of the IL system's
correct diagnosis, will be made worse off compared to the treatment they would
have received if the narrow ML Exception did not exist. In contrast, the patients in
the second group, who would have suffered from the machine's error in any case,
are no worse off than they would have been.
How we measure the cost of the errors to the first group is inevitably
difficult, but without any defensible idea of how big that group would be-
something we could only establish empirically-it is even more impossible to say.
Unfortunately, we can say with some confidence that humans will feel freer to
overrule ML systems under this rule than under the current default rule because
under the current rule an overruling decision would run a greater risk of being
found to depart from the (machine) standard of care. Arguably, this means that the
number of patients harmed by a doctor's ignoring ML's correct diagnosis ought to
grow above the baseline.
Furthermore, if this narrow exception suffices to incentivize medical
service providers and malpractice insurers to keep a human doctor fully in the
loop, then we also will lose all or part of any cost savings from having ML replace
humans, with the size of the loss depending on both the relative costs and the
extent to which human doctors can work more efficiently when paired with ML-
i.e., diagnose more quickly and/or more accurately.
Against these costs, one should put he speculative, but potentially large,
gains caused by creating a data set of human decisions and resulting outcomes that
can be used to provide ongoing training data for ML systems. If-and we stress
that this may be a big "if'-humans end up deciding enough cases differently from
ML to provide enough examples for training purposes, this may suffice to head off
what would otherwise be the monoculture of training data that we warned about in
Part III.
350. See supra text following note 162.
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One other caveat should be noted: for the human-generated training data
to have real value, it needs to include a significant number of cases in which the
human's decision was better than ML's, something which likely will turn on how
great NIL's success rate is. As this point may be obscure, a short elucidation is in
order. We assume ML is on average more accurate than people. But neither is
100% accurate. The less accurate the humans are, the less accurate ML needs to be
in order to be noticeably better than humans. The less accurate a better-than-
humans ML is, the more scope will remain for potential cases in which, were a
human to overrule the ML system, they might improve the patient outcome. (Of
course, there is also the possibility that they might both be wrong in different
ways, but we can collapse that scenario by defining "right" as "better than the
other diagnosis.") Conversely, the more accurate ML is overall, the less frequently
we would expect to see a human decision to override the ML diagnosis lead to a
better outcome.
4. Define the Standard of Care to Require a Human Doctor Plus ML?
Rather than create a malpractice exception for human-ML interactions,
we could instead fix the legal standard of care (either legislatively or judicially) to
require ML plus meaningful review by a human doctor. At present-while human
diagnosticians remain on average superior to ML-any doctor who uses ML as a
decisional aid is in effect subject to this standard of care. We suggested above that
once ML is provably superior to the average human the standard of care would
change, setting off a chain of events ending in the lack of meaningful human
participation in certain diagnostic functions-a state we fear could be deleterious
in the long term.35' Freezing the standard of care to require meaningful human
participation would head off those consequences. Indisputably, "meaningful" is a
somewhat vague term, and it invites some fact-based debate as to what level of
review by a human doctor would suffice. In the abstract, however, it is very hard to
define the appropriate level of review with any precision; litigation in courts may
actually be a good way of developing the factual records needed to put more detail
into this standard.
Both the broad and narrow ML Exceptions to malpractice take large
swaths of human liability out of the equation; in so doing they leave the choice of
using a person or an Al to other factors, namely ethics352 and cost.3 In contrast,
setting the standard of care to require both ML and humans invokes law to
override those ethical and economic concerns, but it does so at the possible price
of forgoing a larger number of beneficial outcomes that will not happen because
the Al plus physician is too expensive.354 The risk here is that some people may
not be able to afford the care that they otherwise might have had.
On the other hand, freezing the standard of care makes it more likely than
does the narrow ML Exception that the rate of human overrides of ML will tend
351. See supra Part I1.
352. Compare Millar & Kerr, supra note 11, with sources cited supra note 88.
353. See supra Section II.A.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 195-97.
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toward the optimal level, where "optimal" refers to individual-patient outcomes
without considering systemic effects on training data. Under the narrow exception,
humans are protected from liability for overruling ML in the absence of gross
negligence, and this opens the door to excessive overrides. In contrast, setting the
standard of care leaves current standards for reviewing a doctor's conduct in
place. 5 Plaintiffs who wish to argue that a physician should have deferred to the
ML will not be able to argue a per se violation of the standard of care, but doctors
challenged for overriding ML will have to make the ordinary fact-based showing
that their decisions were appropriate.
Even if the above is correct, and this proposal comes closest to
incentivizing an optimal rate of human overrides of ML diagnoses, we cannot be
confident that it will necessarily provide a sufficient supply of human-generated,
accurate training data. How much data people will create depends on a number of
variables that can only be estimated once ML is up and running full speed. The
two chief variables are ML's failure rate and what fraction of those failures are
detected and corrected by the human reviewers. (Recall that when humans wrongly
override a correct diagnosis, this does not produce useful training data for ML; it
might, however, provide useful training data for medical students.) We cannot
know at this early stage whether the correct corrections will suffice, but this option
probably gives as much hope as any, and more than most; the only one that comes
close is the narrow ML Exception, and that is because its incentive effects are
likely to be similar.
CONCLUSION: THE LEAST-WORST SOLUTION WILL BE EXPENSIVE
We have argued that if and when Al can outperform human doctors both
malpractice law and, if pricing warrants it, economic imperatives will push
providers to substitute machines for human doctors. This is not as wonderful as it
may sound to technophiles because it creates a subtle risk of a closed loop as well
as the obvious (short-run) opportunity for better patient care.
The risk is a result of Al's great promise. If, as we assumed for the
purposes of this Article, some future ML system becomes ignificantly better at
some types of diagnosis, such as reading x-rays and other radiological studies, then
medical skills may suffer; if and when ML takes over treatment, some specialties
may all but disappear. The problem we are concerned with is not directly the
employment prospect of present or future radiologists. The problem is that the
over-reliance on Al, and the resulting loss of medical knowledge, can create a
closed loop in which future training and validation data sets are the result of
decisions by the Al itself. At that point, we may lose the ability to discover new,
better treatments, in the case where the ML system settles for a sub-optimal
355. Recall that the issue in a medical malpractice case is whether the claimed
injury resulted from the treating physician's departure from "the generally recognized and
accepted practices and procedures that would be followed by the average, competent
physician in the defendant's field of medicine under the same or similar circumstances."
Supra text accompanying note 108.
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solution or the ML chooses a solution that optimizes a narrow performance
criterion.
We can head off this scenario in a number of ways. The simplest legal
change would be to require that a human be fully and meaningfully in the loop in
all cases. Preventing an ML alone from becoming the standard of care, and thus
defining the standard as an ML plus a physician meaningfully involved in
reviewing the diagnostic decision, could alleviate the problem. We may also need
to tinker with malpractice rules to prevent humans from being too unwilling to
overrule an Al for fear of liability.
Admittedly, keeping physicians fully in the loop is likely to prove
expensive compared to an Al-only world. Further, even if it may be a long-term
fix, we should not expect it to be permanent. We will need to continue to revisit
the level at which machines and humans integrate and exchange information and
make decisions. Perhaps worst of all, our solution has more than enough of a whiff
of the Luddite to make any robot or Al enthusiast uncomfortable. Nevertheless, we
see no better answer at present; the remaining challenges will focus on the proper
alignment of humans and machines to integrate and exchange information, and to
make and carry out medical decisions. Figuring out how best to deal with the
alignment questions will be a key consideration in the modernization of medical-
school curricula so that the next generation of medical professionals are adequately
trained to work with ML.
Modern auto-pilots are capable of making complex decisions while flying
jets, decisions which may be too complex for human pilots to follow; in some
cases human intervention prevents accidents, but in others it causes accidents that
the autopilot might have prevented.356 Yet we still require human pilots to be in the
cockpit for the entire flight in case of emergency and despite the arguable
duplication of expense.357 Meanwhile, whether over-reliance on autopilots is
dangerous, in part due to deskilling of pilots, is a live debate.358 Now it's
medicine's turn.
356. Gary Brown, Out of the Loop, 30 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 43, 48-49
(2016).
357. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (2018) ("The pilot in command of an aircraft is
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft."); cf.
Brouse v. United States, 83 F.Supp 373, 374 (N.D. Ohio 1949) ("The obligation of those in
charge of a plane under robot control to keep a proper and constant lookout is
unavoidable.").
358. See Carolyn Presutti, FAA Study Issues Recommendations to Correct Pilot
Overreliance on Automation, VOICE AM. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.voanews.com/a/faa-
study-issues-recommendations-to-correct-pilot-overrelance-on-automation/1795995 .html
(noting FAA's concern that "pilots are not as skilled at manually flying a plane in
emergencies or when transitioning back from automation to manual").
